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OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE THEORIES OF
CONCERTED ACTION
WILLIAM H. PAGE*
The- theory of concerted action is central to antitrust policy because it
shapes legal doctrines that courts use to decide when an oligopoly has become
a cartel. Most directly, it influences the legal definition of agreement-the
"contract, combination . . . or conspiracy" required for Section 1 liability.'
That definition in turn affects the standard of pleading agreement with suffi-
cient specificity to avoid dismissal; 2 the standard of legally sufficient proof of
* Marshall M. Criser Eminent Scholar, University of Florida Levin College of Law. I thank
Jonathan Baker, Malcolm Coate, Joseph Harrington, Jeffrey Harrison, Herbert Hovenkamp, Max
Huffman, John Lopatka, Gregory Werden, Wentong Zheng, and the participants in "Cartels: A
Conference in Honor of Robert F. Lanzillotti" at the University of Florida for helpful comments.
1 15 U.S.C. § 1 ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspir-
acy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is de-
clared to be illegal."). Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
distinguishes between agreement, which requires an exchange of promises, and concerted prac-
tices, which may include parallel actions coordinated by communications other than promises.
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 101, Mar. 30,
2010, 2010 O.J. (C 83) 88 [hereinafter TFEU], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/
LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:en:PDF; see also OLIVER BLACK, CONCEPTUAL
FOUNDATIONS OF ANTrrRUST 164-66 (2005). Both forms of coordination violate Section 1. Com-
pare United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940) (holding "a con-
spiracy to fix prices violates § 1 . . . though no overt act is shown . . . ."), with United States v.
U.S. Steel Corp., 223 F. 55, 159 (D.N.J. 1915), affd, 251 U.S. 417, 460 (1920) (discussed infra
note 19).
Some have suggested that Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45,
which prohibits unfair methods of competition, might reach a broader range of oligopoly pricing
than Section 1. See, e.g., Donald F. Turner, The Definition ofAgreement Under the Sherman Act:
Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 682 (1962). I have argued
that the substantive reach of the two provisions on this issue should be the same because the
interpretation of each rests on the same policy concerns, not on differences in language. William
H. Page, The FTC's Procedural Advantage in Discovering Concerted Action, ANTITRUST
SOURCE, Feb. 2009, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust-source/
Feb09_Page2-26f.authcheckdam.pdf.
2 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007); see also William H. Page,
Twombly and Communication: The Emerging Definition of Concerted Action Under the New
Pleading Standards, 5 J. COMPETITION L. & EcON. 439, 468 (2009).
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agreement to avoid summary judgment;' and the jury instructions that guide
the fact-finder's inference of agreement at trial.4 And, because violations of
Section 1 entail criminal penalties and treble damages, the definition of agree-
ment can deter firms' primary conduct in the market, for good or ill.'
The Supreme Court's various statements over the past century about the
nature of horizontal6 agreement and concerted action have given conflicting
answers to many of the most basic questions that the concept raises. The
Court has said, for example, that an agreement involves a "meeting of minds"'
among rivals or a "conscious commitment to a common scheme"' that need
not be "formal," but it has also said that "tacit collusion" or "oligopolistic
price coordination" is lawful.' 0 This ambiguity about the role of communica-
tion in establishing an agreement or concerted action is potentially costly.
3 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986) (holding that
"[t]o survive a motion for summary judgment or for a directed verdict, a plaintiff seeking dam-
ages for a violation of § 1 must present evidence 'that tends to exclude the possibility' that the
alleged conspirators acted independently."). See generally ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW,
PROOF OF CONSPIRACY UNDER FEDERAL ANTrrRUST LAWS (2010).
4 See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 446 (1978) (disapproving an
instruction in a criminal price-fixing case that rivals who exchanged price information were
presumed to have intended the consequent effects on prices, although the effects "may well
support an inference that the defendant had knowledge of the probability of such a conse-
quence") (emphasis added).
s Christopher Leslie has suggested that "[o]verdeterrence concerns should inform discussions
when the scope of antitrust law is imprecise, [but] they do not really apply when the illegal
conduct is well defined and clearly without redeeming value, such as price-fixing conspiracies."
Christopher R. Leslie, Judgment-Sharing Agreements, 58 DUKE L.J. 747, 803 (2009). Overdeter-
rence concerns reappear, however, if the definition of a price-fixing conspiracy becomes either
ambiguous or overbroad-the contingency I consider in this article. Id. at 803 n.246 (citing
WILLIAM BREIT & KENNETH G. ELZINGA, ANTITRUST PENALTY REFORM: AN ECONOMIC ANALY-
sis 29, 35 (1986) ("If horizontal price fixing could be correctly defined, the problem of
overdeterrence could not occur since horizontal price fixing has little if any social benefit.")
(emphasis added)).
6 Although the histories of the standards for inference of horizontal and vertical agreement
are intertwined, the issues they raise are not necessarily the same. See M. Laurence Popofsky,
Does Leegin Liberate the Law Governing Horizontal Conspiracies from Its Vertical Contamina-
tion?, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 23 (2012). My focus here will be on horizontal agreement.
7 Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946).
8 Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 768 (1984).
9 Am. Tobacco, 328 U.S. at 809; see also United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127,
142-43 (1966) (explicit agreement not required); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334
U.S. 131, 142 (1948) (same).
10 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 227 (1993)
("Tacit collusion, sometimes called oligopolistic price coordination or conscious parallelism, de-
scribes the process, not in itself unlawful, by which firms in a concentrated market might in
effect share monopoly power, setting their prices at a profit-maximizing, supracompetitive level
by recognizing their shared economic interests and their interdependence with respect to price
and output decisions.") (emphasis added). But cf Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib.
Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540 (1954) ("The crucial question is whether respondents' conduct toward
petitioner stemmed from independent decision or from an agreement, tacit or express.").
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Deterring cartels is antitrust's most fundamental goal," but confusion about
whether illegal cartelization requires communication (and, if so, what kind)
fosters judicial errors of underinclusion or overinclusion, depending upon
which definition courts apply.12 Commenting on the uncertainty in 1956, Di-
rector and Levi observed that it would be "difficult and unwise for the law to
assume that action taken on general knowledge implies a concert of action
equivalent to collusion, conspiracy or agreement, and yet the result may be the
same as that which follows from an agreement." 3
In recent decades, however, the confusion has diminished because most
courts and scholars have concluded (or assumed) that the definitions of agree-
ment and concerted action do indeed require communication.14 Some readings
of the state of the law suggest that courts require a completed verbal agree-
ment on future competitive conduct. Jonathan Baker, after reviewing the case
law, concluded in 1996 that "the legal idea of 'agreement' does not describe a
result or equilibrium but one particular process of reaching supracompetitive
marketplace outcomes-what may be termed the 'forbidden process' of nego-
tiation and exchange of assurances."
" See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOx 263 (1978) ("The subject of cartels lies at
the center of antitrust policy.").
12 If the optimal definition is objective and requires communication, the ambiguity invites
false positives, because courts may mistakenly infer agreement in the absence of communication.
See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Identifying Horizontal Price Fixing in the Electronic Marketplace,
65 ANTrrRUST L.J. 41, 47 (1996) (observing that "a court conscientiously applying these defini-
tions would be led to mistakenly infer an agreement merely from the consciously parallel interac-
tion among oligopolists."). If the optimal definition is subjective and does not require
communication, the ambiguity correspondingly fosters false negatives because courts may mis-
takenly find no agreement simply because the parties have not communicated.
13 Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 51 Nw. U. L.
REV. 281, 296 (1956).
14 Williamson Oil Co., Inc. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1323 (11th Cir. 2003)
(affirming the exclusion expert testimony that "defined 'collusion' to include conscious parallel-
ism."); In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2002) (Pos-
ner, J.) (observing that most courts hold "that an express, manifested agreement, and thus an
agreement involving actual, verbalized communication, must be proved in order for a price-
fixing conspiracy to be actionable under the Sherman Act."); see also Superior Offshore Int'l,
Inc. v. Bristow Group, Inc., 490 F. App'x 492, 499-500 (3d Cir. 2012) ("The parallel price
increases here could just as easily be the result of each company independently analyzing the
market and realizing that they needed to charge more in order to make a profit, given that exter-
nal circumstances indicated that they would be providing fewer services to their customers in the
future[, or] given the concentration of the helicopter-services market at issue here, such price
increases could have just as easily been the result of 'price leadership' as of price fixing.");
Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 484 (1st Cir. 1988) ("Courts ... have
almost uniformly held, at least in the pricing area, that such individual pricing decisions (even
when each firm rests its decision upon its belief that competitors will do the same) do not consti-
tute an unlawful agreement under section I of the Sherman Act.").
15 Baker, supra note 12, at 48.
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I agree that the definition of concerted action should include communica-
tion, but not necessarily an exchange of verbal assurances. 16 Rivals may act
concertedly, I have argued, by privately communicating their intention to act
in a certain way and their reliance on their interlocutors to do the same, then
acting consistently with their statements." This definition bears some resem-
blance to the concept of concerted practices in European competition law,
which prohibits rivals telling one another about market actions they "have
decided to adopt or contemplate adopting" thus "facilitating a collusive out-
come."'" The paradigmatic instances of this sort of concerted action in the
United States were the Gary Dinners, 9 but examples continue to come to light
16 See, e.g., William E. Kovacic et al., Plus Factors and Agreement in Antitrust, I 10 MICH. L.
REv. 393, 401 (2011) (reading early Supreme Court cases to establish that "courts would charac-
terize as concerted action interfirm coordination realized by means other than a direct exchange
of assurances.").
17 William H. Page, Communication and Concerted Action, 38 Lov. U. CHI. L.J. 405, 417
(2007) [hereinafter Page, Communication]; William H. Page, A Neo-Chicago Approach to Con-
certed Action, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 173, 184 (2012) [hereinafter Page, Neo-Chicago]. This idea
builds on the analysis of degrees of "correlation" among actions in BLACK, supra note 1, at
185-87. For a more recent discussion, see OLIVER BLACK, AGREEMENTS: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND
LEGAL STUDY 257-322 (2012).
18 Guidelines on the Applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements, 2011 O.J. (C 11) 1, 14. Under the EC's
recent horizontal cooperation guidelines, firms may "adapt themselves intelligently to the ex-
isting or anticipated conduct of their competitors," but may not "disclose to [a] competitor the
course of conduct which they themselves have decided to adopt or contemplate adopting on the
market, thereby facilitating a collusive outcome on the market," particularly where "the data
exchanged is strategic." Id. For discussion, see Howard Rosenblatt & Tomas Nilsson, Analyst
Calls and Price Signaling Under EU Law, ANTITRUST SOURCE, June 2012, http://www.ameri
canbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust-source/junl2_rosenblatt_6_26f.authcheckdam.
pdf.
'9 See William H. Page, The Gary Dinners and the Meaning of Concerted Action, 62 SMU L.
REV. 597 (2009) [hereinafter Page, Gary Dinners]. The dinners and related meetings gathered
competing steel producers in various product lines, under instructions from Judge Elbert Gary of
U.S. Steel not to make any promises or form agreements. Id. at 600. Describing one of the many
dinners, one executive maintained there was no "absolute promise made by anybody" concerning
prices, only their intentions, although the participants left the meetings "with the general under-
standing, each relying upon the other, that the prices announced would be maintained." United
States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 223 F. 55, 159 (D.N.J. 1915), aff'd, 251 U.S. 417 (1920). At the
monopolization trial of U.S. Steel, the following exchange occurred on direct and cross-examina-
tion of this executive:
By Mr. Lindabury [for the defendant]
Q. That [reliance] was faith and hope, though, rather than promise and contract, was it not?
A. Yes.
By Mr. Dickinson [for the government]:
Q. Was a good deal of it faith?
A. Mostly hope.
Q. Did you expect to observe your announcement?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you observe it?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Did others observe it?
A. The larger concerns, the stronger concerns, yes.
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more than a century later.20
To say that the legal definition of agreement requires communication does
not mean that a plaintiff must allege specific communications or produce di-
rect evidence of them; it is sufficient that the circumstances permit a reasona-
ble inference that the requisite communications have occurred. Thus, William
Kovacic and his co-authors have recently begun to identify "super plus fac-
tors"-market conditions and conduct that they suggest create "a strong infer-
ence of explicit collusion." 21 This approach assumes an objective theory of
concerted action.
Some leading scholars have questioned this apparent consensus on the need
for communication. 22 Richard Posner, in scholarly work dating to the 1960s, 23
has argued that oligopolistic price coordination, even if not accompanied by
direct communications between rivals, should meet the definition of agree-
ment. For decades, scholars framed the issue of agreement in terms of Pos-
ner's dispute with Donald Turner, who wrote an influential early article
opposing a definition of illegal agreement that reached pure oligopolistic in-
Page, Gary Dinners, supra, at 604 (quoting Transcript of Record, Plaintiffs Testimony, vol. 6 at
2509, United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920) (No. 481) (testimony of Samuel A.
Brenner)); see also U.S. Steel Corp., 251 U.S. at 460 (Day, J., disssenting) (observing that, in the
dinners, "the assembled trade opponents secured co-operation and joint action through the ma-
chinery of special committees of competing concerns, and by prudent prevision took into ac-
count the possibility of defection, and the means of controlling and perpetuating that industrial
harmony which arose from the control and maintenance of prices.") (emphasis added).
20 See, e.g., In re Publication Paper Antitrust Litig., 690 F.3d 51, 65 (2d Cir. 2012) (reversing
summary judgment where "in private phone calls and meetings-for which no social or personal
purpose has been persuasively identified-[one rival's division president] shared [his firm's]
pricing strategies with [another rival's president] and both men disclosed to each other their
companies' intentions to increase prices before those decisions had been publicly announced").
21 Kovacic et al., supra note 16, at 396-97. They use "'explicit collusion' to mean an agree-
ment among competitors that relies on explicit communication, transfers, or both to suppress
rivalry." Id. at 397 n.14; see also ROBERT C. MARSHALL & LESLIE M. MARx, THE EcoNoMics
OF COLLUSION: CARTELS AND BIDDING RINGs 211-37 (2012); Rosa Abrantes-Metz et al., A
Variance Screen for Collusion, 24 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 467 (2006); Susan Athey et al., Collu-
sion and Price Rigidity, 71 REV. EcoN. STUDIES 317 (2004).
22 In addition to the authorities cited in this paragraph and the next, see Joseph E. Harrington,
Posted Pricing as a Plus Factor, 7 J. COMPETITION L. & EcON. 1, 6 (2011) (describing circum-
stances "under which the parallel adoption of posted pricing is sufficient to establish an agree-
ment to restrain trade"); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., Regulating Oligopoly Conduct Under the
Antitrust Laws, 89 MINN. L. REV. 9, 14 (2004) (offering "a new approach that will preclude
oligopolists' tacit collusion while protecting their right to engage in aggressive independent
competition").
23 Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 STAN. L.
REV. 1562, 1577-78 (1968) [hereinafter Posner, Oligopoly]; RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAw 51-100 (2d ed. 2001). Posner based his legal analysis in part on Stigler's seminal economic
analysis. George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44 (1964); see also In re
High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2002) (Posner, J.) (sug-
gesting that coordinating a price increase through price announcements should constitute an
agreement, but recognizing that most courts do not agree).
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terdependence. 24 For Turner and others, oligopolists are only pricing rationally
when they take account of their rivals' likely responses, 25 so the only effective
antitrust remedy would be to increase the number of rivals by breaking them
up.26 Posner, in contrast, argued that oligopolists can choose to set competitive
prices and would do so if antitrust law adopted standards of liability and pen-
alties that set the proper incentives. 27
Louis Kaplow has now joined Posner in criticizing the communication-
based approach in an important series of articles" and a new book.29 Although
Kaplow stops short of proposing a definition as a standard of liability,3 0 he
argues that the focus of analysis of price fixing should be on whether oligo-
24 See generally John E. Lopatka, Solving the Oligopoly Problem: Turner's Try, 41 ANTI-
TRUST BULL. 843, 889-96 (1996).
25 Turner, supra note 1, at 671 (reasoning that an oligopolist acts as rationally as a competitive
firm except that it "takes one more factor into account-the reactions of his competitors to any
price change he makes").
26 See, e.g., Donald F. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Poli-
cies, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1207, 1230-31 (1969); see also Joe S. Bain, Price Leaders, Barometers,
and Kinks, 33 J. Bus. 193, 203 (1960) ("[T]he proper focus of [antitrust] attack is found in the
structural situations of which various phenomena of conduct are only reflections . . .
27 Posner, Oligopoly, supra note 23, at 1571-72:
Much more is necessary to the disappearance of competitive pricing than the bare
fact that there are only a few sellers in the market. To begin with, just as in the atomis-
tic market, each seller must make a deliberate choice not to expand output to the point
where the cost of the last unit of output equals the market price, or, if he is at that
point, to reduce output. There is a real choice here. It is not irrational for an oligopolist
to decide to set a price that approximates marginal cost. It is not an unprofitable point
at which to sell (so long as cost is defined to include a sufficient profit to make produc-
tion attractive to investors), and it may have definite attractions: if the oligopolist finds
speculation about the probable reactions of his rivals as inconclusive as suggested in
the earlier discussion of interdependence; if he believes that new entry or the competi-
tion of substitute products will prevent him from obtaining appreciable monopoly prof-
its; if he distrusts his competitors and fears that any higher price would quickly be
eroded by cheaters, placing him at a temporary disadvantage if he did not cheat; or if
restricting output would lay him open to heavy punishment ....
For discussion of the Chicago School's rejection of the structure-conduct-performance paradigm,
see Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 1890-1955, 94 MINN. L.
Rav. 311, 360-62 (2009).
28 See Louis Kaplow, Direct Versus Communications-Based Prohibitions on Price Fixing, 3 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 449 (2011) [hereinafter Kaplow, Direct]; Louis Kaplow, On the Meaning of
Horizontal Agreements in Competition Law, 99 CALIF. L. REv. 683 (2011) [hereinafter Kaplow,
Horizontal Agreements]; Louis Kaplow, An Economic Approach to Price Fixing, 77 ANTITRUST
L.J. 343 (2011) [hereinafter Kaplow, Economic Approach].
29 Louis KAPLOW, COMPETITION POLICY AND PRICE FIXING (2013).
30 Kaplow, Horizontal Agreements, supra note 28, at 816 ("Even though virtually all of the
considerations seem to point in the same direction, this Article does not come close to demon-
strating that it would be good policy to proscribe and highly penalize all instances in which
interdependent oligopolistic behavior appears to occur."); Kaplow, Economic Approach, supra
note 28, at 449 ("This body of work constitutes a strong critique of existing modes of thought,
even though it does not advocate for a particular legal rule . . . ."); KAPLOW, supra note 29, at
451 ("In spite of the book's extensive investigation, which generates a number of strong claims
and criticisms, any policy lessons must be viewed as quite tentative.").
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polists set noncompetitive prices interdependently in an economic sense.31
Communication of one sort or another may be a facilitating practice or a
mechanism for achieving this sort of anticompetitive cooperation.3 2 It can be
evidence that rivals have reached a meeting of the minds on a noncompetitive
price." It might also provide strong evidence that rivals have attempted to
coordinate prices, if that were a separate offense.3 4 It should not, however, be
necessary to establish the offense. The literature, he notes pointedly, has failed
to settle on what sorts of communications are prohibited, suggesting the diffi-
culty if not the impossibility of the task.35 Indeed, Kaplow argues that requir-
ing particular forms of communication to prove agreement merely confuses
the inquiry, introducing incoherencies, and potentially undermines social wel-
fare by immunizing inefficient tacit price coordination. Instead, if oligopolists
were subject to an appropriate definition of illegal price coordination and ex-
pected properly defined civil and criminal penalties, they would behave com-
petitively, without continuing regulatory injunctions.3 6 Thus, even markets
structured in ways that are highly conducive to coordination would have
prices close to marginal cost.37
This dispute is between objective and subjective theories of concerted ac-
tion. For Kaplow, the "subjective notion [of a meeting of the minds] . . . is at
the heart of interdependent behavior, including in particular successful coordi-
nated oligopoly pricing."38 To satisfy the objective theory, reflected in current
consensus, firms must coordinate their actions by an objectively manifested
mechanism, a defined form of communication.3 9 If firms accomplish coordi-
nation without communication, the conduct is not concerted in a legal sense.
31 KAPLOw, supra note 29, at 33 (claiming that "the term agreement may, consistent with
wider usage, readily be defined to embrace interdependent oligopolistic price elevation, which
entails the required meeting of the minds"). Scott Hemphill and Tim Wu make a related argu-
ment with respect to oligopolistic exclusionary practices, although the legal issues differ. See C.
Scott Hemphill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182 (2013).
32 Kaplow, Economic Approach, supra note 28, at 388 ("[D]irect interfirm communications,
taken by many to be determinative of what constitutes a price-fixing agreement, can also be
viewed as facilitating practices.").
33 KAPLOw, supra note 29, at 304.
34Id. at 314-17.
35 Id. at 57-61.
36 Kaplow, Economic Approach, supra note 28, at 430-32.
37 See id. at 401-03.
38 Kaplow, Horizontal Agreements, supra note 28, at 731. But cf id. at 792 n.257 ("Players
are not actually in each other's minds, which is impossible short of psychoanalysis, hypnosis, or
MRI scans, none of which are taken to be pertinent here or in other settings in which such
characterizations are offered."). In the same footnote, Kaplow cites Posner, Oligopoly, supra
note 23, at 1576 n.39 ("The proposition that a belief in mental telepathy is not necessary to allow
one to conclude that there may be a 'meeting of the minds' without verbal interchanges has been
illuminated by game theorists.").
39 For example, Oliver Black arranges parallel human conduct on a spectrum of correlation,
running from entirely independent action to concerted action, which is aimed at the same goal,
2013] 221
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Coordination by communication entails finding a common goal, and the infor-
mation exchanged is strategic in the sense of bearing on future plans and out-
comes, but the focus of the objective theory is on the use of communication to
achieve the noncompetitive outcome rather than on the interlocutors' mental
state.
In this essay, I will examine the relative merits of these two legal ap-
proaches to the problem of concerted action, focusing on Kaplow's arguments
and on whether a move to a standard of liability based on the subjective the-
ory of concerted action would be likely to improve social welfare. I begin in
the next Part by examining more closely the nature of the subjective definition
of agreement, explaining the kinds of conduct and market equilibria that it
includes and excludes. In Part II, I evaluate the subjective definition of agree-
ment by comparing it to the objective, communication-based approach. In do-
ing so, I describe the error-cost analysis I will use and the social harm that the
prohibition of agreements in restraint of trade is designed to resolve. I argue
that the subjective definition would prohibit only a limited number of durable
anticompetitive arrangements that are not already illegal. Moreover, adoption
of the subjective definition, as framed by Kaplow, would likely entail both
new false negatives and new false positives. I examine both kinds of potential
costs and conclude by arguing that the law should retain the objective defini-
tion's requirement of communication.
I. THE SUBJECTIVE THEORY OF CONCERTED ACTION
Following standard usage, Kaplow characterizes rivals' actions as interde-
pendent if their minds meet in choosing a course of conduct.40 More contro-
versially, he suggests that this meeting of the minds is the appropriate basis
for the definition of agreement in antitrust law, in part because it is consistent
with the concept of equilibrium in modem economic game theory. In order to
clarify the concept as a possible legal standard, he explains both what sorts of
market conduct it includes and what it does not include.
A. INCLUDED CONDUCT
To reach a meeting of the minds on a course of action, firms must infer
their rivals' beliefs and intentions about a range of future choices and act in
anticipation of these inferences. In the familiar example of two gas stations at
the same corner in a remote town,41 the stations act interdependently if one
done with mutual knowledge and reliance, and achieved, at least in part, by communication. See
Page, Communication, supra note 17, at 426-27 (discussing BLACK, supra note 1, at 185-87).
4 Kaplow, Horizontal Agreements, supra note 28, at 696.
41 See, e.g., Hemphill & Wu, supra note 31, at 1185; Dennis W. Carlton et al., Communication
Among Competitors: Game Theory and Antitrust, 5 GEO. MASON L. REv. 423, 426-28 (1997). A
recent real-world example may be White v. R.M. Packer Co., 635 F.3d 571, 580-86 (1st Cir.
222 [Vol. 79
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posts a new, higher price (unjustified by a cost increase or a change in de-
mand conditions), anticipating that its rival will find it preferable to match the
price rather than undercut it, and its rival, recognizing the new price as an
opportunity, matches the price, with the expectation that the first mover will
see the price matching as an adoption of the new price for the indefinite fu-
ture. The first mover invites coordination and the second, getting the message
and considering its appropriately discounted payoffs in likely scenarios in
later periods, accepts it.42 If rivals arrive at a common strategy based on these
conjectures, they have reached a meeting of minds pursuant to which they act
interdependently, in the same way and to the same effect as if they had com-
municated directly before the price increase. 43 This outcome amounts, under
the subjective theory, to price fixing with all its accompanying static and dy-
namic inefficiencies.4
Kaplow explicitly links this idea of interdependent action to the concept of
cooperative oligopoly equilibrium in "noncooperative" game theory, so called
(confusingly, he correctly points out) because the players cannot form binding
contracts as they can in cooperative game theory.45 In a one-shot game, in
which firms set a price for only one period, oligopolists will (with exceptions
to be noted later) choose a competitive price, even though they would be
better off if both of them chose the monopoly price or one close to it.46 As in
the classic Prisoner's Dilemma, each firm calculates that it will maximize
profit for that period by charging a competitive price regardless of whether its
rival charges a competitive or a supracompetitive price. 47
2011), holding that evidence of parallel pricing by gas stations on Martha's Vineyard, despite
drops in demand, was insufficient to raise an inference of agreement. "Plaintiffs ambiguous
evidence [including some communication was] entirely consistent with permissible conscious
parallelism." Id. at 585.
42 Posner, Oligopoly, supra note 23, at 1576 ("A seller communicates his 'offer' by restricting
output, and the offer is 'accepted' by the actions of his rivals in restricting their outputs as
well.").
43 Kaplow, Horizontal Agreements, supra note 28, at 789 ("Whether a pair of strategies con-
stitutes an equilibrium for two gas stations engaged in price signaling with their price postings or
having a discussion in a smoke-filled room leading them to charge the monopoly price depends
on precisely the same calculations that compare the gain from defection with the lost future
profits due to the other firm's anticipated response."); Kaplow, Direct, supra note 28, at 458
(same); Kaplow, Economic Approach, supra note 28, at 352 (same).
44 Kaplow, Economic Approach, supra note 28, at 353-62.
45 Kaplow, Horizontal Agreements, supra note 28, at 780. Cooperative game theory is irrele-
vant to antitrust law, because any arrangement that the law would classify as an agreement is
illegal and not legally enforceable. Kaplow, Economic Approach, supra note 28, at 350. Even
within noncooperative game theory, however, parties may reach cooperative outcomes. Id.
46 Kaplow, Horizontal Agreements, supra note 28, at 783; Kaplow, Economic Approach,
supra note 28, at 351.
47 See Jonathan B. Baker, Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oli-
gopoly Problem, and Contemporary Economic Theory, 38 ANTrrRUST BULL. 143, 155 (1993)
("Each firm [charges the competitive price] because it recognizes that its rivals have a strong
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In an infinitely repeated game, however, strategic thinking may allow firms
to sustain a noncompetitive price. 48 In a duopoly, for example, one firm may
risk raising the price in one period as an invitation, and the other may match
it, if it thinks charging a lower price will just cause its rival to charge lower
prices in later periods. The firm will contemplate cheating in a later period in
order to garner short-term profits but will not actually cheat "as long as it
values the gain of one period's profits . . . less than the loss of ten periods'
profits spread in the future" that it would lose when its rival met the lower
price.49 If both firms think this way, they may continue to charge the monop-
oly price indefinitely. If they both appraise the situation another way, then
they may sustain an equilibrium at any other price, including the competitive
one. Kaplow describes the selection of an equilibrium as "an intersubjective
process, the conclusion of which may aptly be described as a meeting of the
minds[.]" 0 Firm A must assess what its rival is B likely to do, bearing in mind
that B is making a similar assessment about what A will do. In a Nash equilib-
rium in an infinitely repeated game, the rivals "predict [the equilibrium price],
predict that their opponents predict it, and so on[,J"" taking account of what
would occur if each were to defect.5 2
Nothing in this process requires communication among the rivals beyond a
general knowledge of the market, particularly publicly announced prices.53
incentive to cheat, and that cheating by a rival is very costly to a firm that does not compete.")
(discussing Stigler, supra note 23).
48 Kaplow, Horizontal Agreements, supra note 28, at 785-86; see also Baker, supra note 47,
at 155 ("The repetition of the game can change the outcome [because a] firm that cheats must
now trade off the short-run gains from cheating against the now-larger cost.").
49 Kaplow, Horizontal Agreements, supra note 28, at 787. In considering the implementation
of an agreement, Kaplow builds on Edward J. Green & Robert H. Porter, Noncooperative Collu-
sion Under Imperfect Price Information, 52 ECONOMETRICA 87 (1984). Kaplow, Horizontal
Agreements, supra note 28, at 786 n.241. See also Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, Collusion
over the Business Cycle, 28 RAND J. EcON. 82 (1997) (analyzing the effect of demand shocks
on collusive prices).
50 Kaplow, Horizontal Agreements, supra note 28, at 791.
51 Id. at 791 (quoting DREw FUDENBERG & JEAN TIROLE, GAME THEORY 13 (1991)).
52 Id. at 792; see also Edward J. Green et al., Tacit Collusion in Oligopoly, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ANTRUST EcoNoMIcs (D. Daniel Sokol & Roger Blair eds.)
(forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 25), available at https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/-marx/bio/pa
pers/tacitcollusion.pdf (collusion requires "higher-order knowledge," that is "[c]ommon knowl-
edge, and mutual knowledge about other players' mental states (e.g., intentions, beliefs) . . .
5 See supra note 43. But cf Green et al., supra note 52, at 25, which notes:
[Allthough direct observation (without communication) by all competitors is sufficient
to establish mutual knowledge of an observable fact, it is not sufficient to establish
mutual knowledge of one another's intentions. In particular, given that repeated games
. . . have both competitive and collusive equilibria, one competitor cannot observe
which equilibrium another expects everyone else to play (and so will play himself).
Thus, in any cartel situation-even a duopoly-it is difficult to see how [prospective
colluders] would achieve mutual knowledge of each other's intent to collude, unless
they were to communicate those intentions to one another.
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This characteristic of Kaplow's idea of interdependent conduct would, if in-
corporated into a legal definition of agreement, represent an important expan-
sion of liability from current law: it would prohibit rivals from reaching a
noncompetitive outcome by interdependent conjectures and actions, regard-
less of whether they communicated in doing so. 54 Kaplow recognizes that
communication can be useful for firms to reach agreement, but argues that it
should not be part of the legal definition of agreement. First, communication
is an ambiguous term because communication in some sense is necessary for
markets to function at all. Some forms of indirect or oblique communication
among firms (by price announcements, for example), always occur in oligop-
oly.5 5 Under a subjective definition of coordination, it does not matter how
firms gather knowledge: if they reach a meeting of the minds with respect to a
noncompetitive price and output combination, their conduct is illegal. Kaplow
describes a range of categories of evidence, such as certain pricing patterns,
price elevations, and facilitating practices, from which courts could infer the
existence of successful oligopolistic price coordination and impose appropri-
ate penalties to deter the practice.5 6 He also considers how market conditions
should figure in the process of inference depending upon whether they are
more or less conducive to coordination.
Kaplow suggests that parallel adoption of a facilitating practice, which
makes it easier for rivals to select the same price and output, is evidence of
oligopolistic coordination, but only if coordination is the primary purpose of
the practice." Inferring coordination from the use of a facilitating practice "is
sensible when there exists no other explanation for the practice or when other
explanations can be shown to be implausible in a particular case. In contrast,
practices that may facilitate oligopolistic interdependence but would likely be
employed regardless are not directly probative." 58 Thus, if a practice is benefi-
cial in certain ways but also makes it easier for rivals to coordinate prices, the
practice would not provide evidence of an agreement to fix prices.
54 Under present law, courts often exclude expert economic opinion testimony on the ultimate
question of whether the defendants have conspired because economics does not distinguish ex-
press collusion from oligopolistic interdependence. See John E. Lopatka & William H. Page,
Economic Authority and the Limits of Expertise in Antitrust Cases, 90 CORNELL L. REv. 617,
673-83 (2005).
55 Kaplow, Horizontal Agreements, supra note 28, at 698-99; Kaplow, Direct, supra note 28,
at 481-82; see also BLACK, supra note 1, at 152-55 (distinguishing forms of communication);
Gregory Werden, Economic Evidence on the Existence of Collusion: Reconciling Antitrust Law
with Oligopoly Theory, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 719, 735 (2004) ("It does not stretch the meaning of
the term to say that communication occurs when rivals observe each others' marketplace actions,
e.g., which customers each seller supplies and at what prices.").
56 See Kaplow, Economic Approach, supra note 28, at 376-403.
57 Id. at 388 ("[P]ractices that may facilitate oligopolistic interdependence but would likely be
employed regardless are not directly probative.").
58 Id. at 388-89.
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Communication-based definitions of concerted action must limit the con-
cept of communication by some further specification.59 For example, some
definitions refer to an exchange of assurances.so My own definition of con-
certed action, as I noted earlier, requires private statements of intention (or
"strategy") and reliance.6' Whatever the definition, direct evidence of the rele-
vant communications and circumstantial evidence of those communications
and opportunities to communicate will both be probative.62
In some instances, however, direct evidence of communications will be un-
available and courts will be asked to infer from circumstantial evidence not
only whether firms coordinated their pricing but also whether they did so by
communicating. 63 Kaplow notes an implication of a communication-based
definition-one that scholars and courts have long recognized-that proving
concerted action, so defined, solely by circumstantial evidence involves a
"paradox of proof": courts may be unable to infer agreement from noncom-
petitive conduct where market conditions are most conducive to coordination.
If market conditions make coordination easy, rivals have a motive to con-
5 Carlton et al., supra note 41, at 431-36 (distinguishing types of communications based on
their likely beneficial or anticompetitive effects).
6o See, e.g., Baker, supra note 12, at 47-48. Cf. MARSHALL & MARX, supra note 21, at ix
("This book is about explicit collusion.").
61 See, e.g., Page, Communication, supra note 17, at 417. Economists distinguish between
communication to initiate collusion and communication to implement coordinated action. See
Green et al., supra note 52, at 5-8. In my formulation, communication for either purpose would
be sufficient to establish concerted action. The statements must be sufficiently clear to convey
both intention to act in a certain way and reliance on the opposing party to do likewise. Ordinary
public price announcements would not normally satisfy this condition. But formally public com-
munications can convey private information that only rivals can fully interpret. Cf. Administra-
tive Complaint, Valassis Commc'ns, Inc., FTC Docket No. C-4160 (Mar. 14, 2006), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510008/060314cmp05l0008.pdf; Analysis of Agreement Con-
taining Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, In re Valassis Commc'ns, Inc., 71 Fed. Reg.
13,976, 13,978-79 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Mar. 20, 2006) (describing the use of a quarterly "earn-
ings call" to convey information to rivals as an invitation to collude); see also Maurice E. Stucke,
Evaluating the Risks of Increased Price Transparency, ANTITRUST, Spring 2005, at 82 (noting
that courts are more likely to infer agreement from the exchange of private, confidential, specific,
and future price information).
62 In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig, 385 F.3d 350, 361 (3d Cir. 2004) ("The most important
evidence will generally be non-economic evidence 'that there was an actual, manifest agreement
not to compete."' (quoting In re High Fructose Coin Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 661
(7th Cir. 2002))). For recent analysis of this sort of testimony, see In re Urethane Antitrust Litig.,
912 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1155 (D. Kan. 2012) (identifying testimony describing admissions of
agreement and "evidence of a great number of communications and meetings and even vacations
involving executives for these competitors, including communications involving pricing, and
including communications at or near the time of price increase announcements by the
companies.").
63 Bell AtI. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 n.4 (2007) ("The parties in this case agree
that 'complex and historically unprecedented changes in pricing structure made at the very same
time by multiple competitors, and made for no other discernible reason,' would support a plausi-
ble inference of conspiracy."); In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 29 (7th Cir.
2010) (Posner, J.) ("Circumstantial evidence can establish an antitrust conspiracy.").
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spire;M if the rivals are coordinating, they are acting contrary to their indepen-
dent interests as competitors. 65 But they may only be acting interdependently,
without the requisite communication. Consequently, coordinated price move-
ments under these conditions "may not suffice-by themselves-to defeat
summary judgment on a claim of horizontal price-fixing among oligopolists""
because courts will be unable to infer that they coordinated by communicat-
ing.67 Only if market conditions are less conducive to coordination will evi-
dence of successful coordination permit an inference that it was accomplished
by communication. Thus, some harmful instances of oligopoly behavior that
the subjective definition condemns may be immunized by the objective defini-
tion, in the absence of direct evidence or admissions, even if the rivals actu-
ally communicated.
Under current law, courts use the concept of plus factors to distinguish
agreement from pure interdependence. Kaplow correctly observes courts have
not used this concept consistently. 68 As I noted earlier, recent scholarship has
6 Flat Glass, 385 F.3d at 360.
65 Id. at 360-61.
6 Id. at 361.
67 Kaplow, Horizontal Agreements, supra note 28, at 758-65; Kaplow, Direct, supra note 28,
at 493-94. For an earlier account the paradox or "dilemma," see Baker, supra note 47, at
169-70:
[On the one hand, if] the economic environment in the industry in which parallel pric-
ing is observed is not conducive to coordination, for example, because cheating is
difficult to detect or punish, then it would be irrational for the firms to reach an agree-
ment. If it would be irrational to agree, an agreement is unlikely to have been reached.
[On the other hand, if] the economic environment is conducive to coordination, then
the firms may establish focal rules for achieving high prices through coordination
without engaging in the process that the law terms an agreement. Reaching an agree-
ment may confer little additional market power upon the firms, and it will raise the
risks of a costly antitrust prosecution. If an agreement is unnecessary for firms to
achieve the observed coordinated outcome, then it would be irrational for the firms to
agree; under such circumstances, parallel pricing will be understood as arising more
plausibly from independent decision making under conditions of oligopolistic interde-
pendence than from an agreement to fix price. [Both lines of reasoning] can be ex-
pected to lead courts often to question whether it would be rational for the firms to
agree. A court that experiences such doubts will be reluctant to infer an agreement to
fix price under Sherman Act § 1 from circumstantial evidence.
See also POSNER, ANTrrRUST LAW, supra note 23, at 100 (requiring communication "produces
the paradox that the more conducive the market's structure is to collusion without express com-
munication, the weaker the plaintiffs case."); Julian M. Joshua & Sarah Jordan, Combinations,
Concerted Practices and Cartels: Adopting the Concept of Conspiracy in European Community
Competition Law, 24 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 647, 661-64 (2004) (recognizing the dilemma and
suggesting that European courts and agencies have begun to resolve the dilemma, for hardcore
cartels, by reference to the American law of conspiracy in restraint of trade).
68 See Kaplow, Horizontal Agreements, supra note 28, at 749-52. Some cases appear to use it
to infer only interdependence or action contrary to independent self-interest, while others appear
to use it to infer something beyond interdependence. Some courts suggest that direct evidence of
certain communications obviates the need for a plus factor analysis. Edward J. Sweeney & Sons
v. Texaco Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 129 (3d Cir. 1980). Others characterize direct evidence of some
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sought to identify "super plus factors," market circumstances that justify an
inference of explicit agreement without direct evidence of communication, 69
but (thus far) no court has explicitly adopted this approach.
B. EXCLUDED CONDUCT
Kaplow emphasizes that interdependence does not mean simply that rivals
are mutually aware of one another's actions. He properly criticizes the com-
mon equation of interdependence with "conscious parallelism," which can
mean a simple awareness of others' parallel actions with a common external
cause-like pedestrians simultaneously opening umbrellas on the same street
when rain begins to fall. Even a competitive firm that raised its prices in
response to an increase in the cost of inputs would probably be aware if its
rivals also increased prices. In this case, however, the competitive firm "takes
other firms' behavior . . . as given" 0 in choosing its price. A firm acts inde-
pendently, even if it takes account of its rivals' actions, so long as the rivals'
actions are determined by other forces, and thus simply givens for the firm. It
acts interdependently only if rivals engage in strategic estimation of each
others' choices among a range of possible equilibria in present and later
periods.
Kaplow also excludes, explicitly or implicitly, several equilibria from his
suggested definition of liability. First, he excludes the competitive equilib-
rium, even if it was achieved through a meeting of minds among oligopolists.
Kaplow recognizes that, in oligopoly, firms might choose the competitive
price by a meeting of the minds,71 although they might also reach that result
by independent choices. 2 He suggests, however, that the concept of agree-
ment should reach "only those meetings of the minds that involve mutually
kinds of communications as a plus factor. White v. R.M. Packer Co., 635 F.3d 571, 583 (1st Cir.
2011); Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., 203 F.3d 1028, 1047 (8th Cir. 2000)
(Gibson, J., dissenting) (communications about completed transaction were "circumstantial evi-
dence of a type of behavior one would not expect in the absence of a [preexisting] agreement to
cooperate."). Still others infer that communications occurred based only on noncommunicative
market conduct. City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc. 158 F.3d 548, 572 n.38 (1lth Cir.
1998) (reasoning that "high incumbency rates exhibited in the market would not likely have
occurred in the absence of some sort of communication among the defendants [and therefore
they] establish the necessary 'plus factor.').
69 See Kovacic et al., supra note 16, at 397; see also Page, Communication, supra note 17, at
417 (a plus factor can be "a constellation of pieces of evidence that, taken as a whole, create the
necessary inference" of concerted action).
70 Kaplow, Horizontal Agreements, supra note 28, at 697.
7' Id. at 795; see also Malcolm B. Coate, Should Economic Theory Control Price Fixing
Analysis? 29 (Apr. 29, 2013) (unpublished manuscript) (although "the outcome of such a game
MAY involve firms earning profits by pricing substantially above the competitive level . . . . the
analyst can tweak the structure of the game, and recover a competitive outcome."), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=2103359.
72 Kaplow, Horizontal Agreements, supra note 28, at 796.
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advantageous cooperation" to reach a higher price.73 Alternatively, he sug-
gests that a competitive equilibrium might involve an agreement, but not one
in restraint of trade: "the purpose of competition law's prohibition on horizon-
tal agreements is to prevent groups of firms from behaving as if they were a
single firm rather than as competitors, and it is precisely the decision to play
oligopolistic equilibrium strategies that brings about the disfavored result."7 4
For similar reasons, he argues, enforcement should be limited to instances of
substantial elevations in price.75
Kaplow emphasizes that his approach would condemn only those ineffi-
cient equilibria that rivals achieve by successful oligopolistic interdepen-
dence; it would not prohibit all inefficient equilibria. He agrees, for example,
with the accepted rule of American antitrust law that simple monopoly pricing
by a single firm is lawful,' even if inefficient in a static sense, because the
prospect of monopoly profits is necessary to spur investment and innovation:
[C]ompetition regimes, such as that in the United States, tend to tolerate
monopoly pri&ing as long as the monopoly position was obtained and is
maintained through efficient behavior-producing products that consumers
value and selling them at sufficiently attractive prices-rather than through
exclusionary practices. This permissive approach is not without costs; ex
ante incentives can be excessive and ex post payoffs, with accompanying
allocative inefficiency, may be more than is necessary to induce investment.
Hence, intellectual property rights tend to be limited, and direct regulation of
monopoly is sometimes imposed. However, the judgment behind general
competition regimes is that, in other settings, monopolies should be permit-
ted to price as they wish, although the degree to which this view is accepted
varies across jurisdictions.7 7
Kaplow thus recognizes that an antitrust rule that tolerates unilateral monop-
oly pricing entails some false negatives in principle because it condones all
monopolists' output restrictions regardless of whether they actually spur inno-
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Kaplow, Economic Approach, supra note 28, at 414-15.
76 See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis. v. Marshfield Clinic, 65 F.3d 1406,
1413 (7th Cir. 1995) ("A natural monopolist that acquired and maintained its monopoly without
excluding competitors by improper means is not guilty of 'monopolizing' in violation of the
Sherman Act, and can therefore charge any price that it wants, for the antitrust laws are not a
price-control statute or a public-utility or common-carrier rate-regulation statute.") (citations
omitted). At least on paper, excessive pricing may constitute abuse of a dominant position, but
applications of the rule are unusual. TFEU, art. 101, supra note 1; see also Michal S. Gal,
Monopoly Pricing as an Antitrust Offense in the U.S. and the EC: Two Systems of Belief About
Monopoly?, 49 ArrrRUST BULL. 343, 376 (2004) (even though challenges to excessive pricing
are rare, "there is a significant conceptual difference between the two approaches because in the
EC the reticence to intervene is based on practical reasons, while in the U.S. it is based on
theoretical and ideological ones.").




vation in particular cases. Unilateral monopoly pricing is nonetheless legal,
even if static efficiency losses from the present, very certain output restriction
are greater than the discounted value of any dynamic efficiency gains from
possible future innovation.
Courts might try to frame antitrust rules to make this sort of distinction
directly and prohibit only the instances of monopoly pricing that are ineffi-
cient on balance. Herbert Hovenkamp and Christina Bohannan, for example,
have argued that the law should require firms enforcing intellectual property
rights to show that an infringer is imposing "IP injury," that is, an injury to the
IP owner's incentive to innovate."8 Antitrust law could analogously condemn
unilateral monopoly pricing if the resulting monopoly profit was more than
would have been necessary, from an ex ante perspective, to induce the firm to
innovate. 9 Alternatively, monopoly pricing could be prima facie unlawful,
subject to a defense that some or all of the resulting profit was necessary to
spur innovation. Such a rule would directly address the concern that prohibit-
ing monopoly pricing would undermine incentives. Apparently, however,
Kaplow agrees with American law's assessment that false positives in the
enforcement of such a rule would deter innovation; better to keep the safe
harbor for unilateral, nonexclusionary exploitation of monopoly power.
Kaplow reasons that coordinated exploitation of monopoly power is cate-
gorically more likely to reduce welfare than unilateral exploitation of monop-
oly power.8 0 He recognizes that, even within a cartel, a firm has some
incentive to reduce its costs and improve its product by innovation but he
finds an "insufficient nexus"8 ' with dynamic efficiency to justify exceptions to
the ban on price fixing. Coordinated exploitation, Kaplow reasons, "does not
reward firms to the extent that they outperform their competitors but instead
bestows profits whose magnitude depends on firms' success in refraining
from competition." 82 He adds that firms may have less incentive to innovate
and reduce costs in a tacit cartel than an explicit cartel because they are less
able to "rationalize production" and thus achieve economies of scale. 3
7 8 CHRISTINA BoHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: PRO-
MOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 51 (2012) ("IP law should recognize harm only
for uses that are likely to interfere with IP holders' decisions to create or distribute their works-
that is, only for harms that are consistent with the constitutional mandate that the purpose of the
patent and copyright systems is to further innovation.").
7 Id. ("[O]nly an ex ante view can relate IP injury to the incentive to innovate.").
s0 See KAPLOW, supra note 29, at 228-30; Kaplow, Economic Approach, supra note 28, at
360.
81 Kaplow, Direct, supra note 28, at 461.
82 Id. at 460-61.
83 Kaplow, Horizontal Agreements, supra note 28, at 812; Kaplow, Economic Approach,
supra note 28, at 361.
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Kaplow also recognizes that price leadership by a dominant firm is inde-
pendent. 4 A dominant firm (or partial monopolist) in a market with a fringe
of much smaller competitors must consciously take account of the output of
its smaller rivals." In the classic model, the dominant firm concedes its rivals
a share of the market; it subtracts their supply from the market demand and
constructs the residual demand and marginal revenue curves that it faces. It
maximizes profit by acting as a monopolist with respect to the residual de-
mand: it sets its output where its residual marginal revenue equals its marginal
cost and sets its price at the corresponding point on the residual demand
curve. Its smaller rivals set their output at the point at which their marginal
cost equals the dominant firm's price. In this model, the firms are, in some
sense, coordinating their price and output decisions by taking account of one
another's actions. Given its static assumptions, however, the model is deter-
minate and each firm is setting the only profit-maximizing price. For this rea-
son, Jesse Markham long ago suggested in a classic article that the dominant
firm case is more akin to pure monopoly pricing than to typical oligopolistic
price leadership, from an antitrust point of view. 6 Kaplow agrees, at least if
the competitive fringe were all price takers incapable of acting strategically.17
Condemning dominant firm pricing as price fixing would be as problematic,
in terms of firm incentives, as condemning pure monopoly pricing.
Kaplow also recognizes that two other noncompetitive oligopoly equilibria
do not involve a meeting of minds, in the sense he uses the term." First,
unlike Posner,8 9 Kaplow would not define the classic Cournot equilibrium as
interdependent.90 In a Coumot duopoly, "each firm chooses its quantity rather
84 KAPLOW, supra note 29, at 349. He traces the theory to Karl Forchheimer, Theoretisches
zum Unvollstandigen Monopole [The Theory of Partial Monopoly], in 32 JAHRBUCH FOR
GESETZGEBUNG, VERWALTUNG UND VOLKSWIRTSCHAFT IM DEUTSCHEN REICH 1 (Gustav
Schmoller ed., 1908). Id. at 349 n.5.
85 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 937, 944-52 (1981).
86 See Jesse W. Markham, The Nature and Significance of Price Leadership, 41 Am. EcON.
REv. 891, 895 (1951).
87 KAPLOW, supra note 29, at 349. Cf. Kaplow, Economic Approach, supra note 28, at 369
(sustained supracompetitive pricing may be the result of a cost advantage, not coordinated
pricing).
88 See Kaplow, Economic Approach, supra note 28, at 442-43; Kaplow, Horizontal Agree-
ments, supra note 28, at 784 n.237 (citing AUGUSTIN COURNOT, RECHERCHES SUR LES PRINCIPES
MATH9MATIQUES DE LA THtORIE DES RiCHESSEs (1838); Joseph Bertrand, Book Review, 67
JOURNAL DES SAvANTs 499 (1883) (reviewing LtON WALRAs, THAORIE MATHtMATIQUES DE LA
RICHESSE SOCIALE (1883) and AUGUSTIN CouRNoT, RECHERCHES SUR LES PRINCIPES MATHtMA-
TIQUES DE LA THtORIE DES RICHESSES (1838)). In KAPLOW, supra note 29, at 362-65, the differ-
entiated products case, discussed later in this paragraph, is not attributed to Bertrand.
89 See POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 23, at 98. For discussion, see Werden, supra note
55, at 775-76.
9 See Hovenkamp, supra note 27, at 314-17 (on the role of Cournot in the history of eco-
nomic theory).
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than its price" simultaneously for homogeneous products, taking its rival's
output as fixed.91 In this model, each firm chooses an output less than half of
the competitive output, in order, in effect, to set a profit-maximizing price for
the portion of the market not supplied by its rival. The resulting equilibrium
price is lower than the monopoly equilibrium price and higher than the com-
petitive equilibrium price. Because each firm does not choose its output based
on an estimate of its rival's output choices in likely future scenarios, the equi-
librium does not involve a meeting of the minds, as Kaplow defines it; it is a
unilateral exercise of market power in a two-stage game. Second, in one type
of Bertrand duopoly, each firm sets its price rather than its quantity, but for
differentiated products, so cutting the price reduces the seller's per-unit profit
but only marginally increases its total sales. As each firm trades off the in-
verse effects of price and volume to maximize profit, the market reaches an
equilibrium higher than the competitive level.92 Because each rival is taking
the actions the others as given, the equilibrium is not collusive.
II. EVALUATING A MOVE TO THE SUBJECTIVE THEORY
Defining concerted action entails framing a rule of liability. Since Frank
Easterbrook's seminal article, The Limits of Antitrust,93 scholars usually argue
about antitrust rules in terms of error-cost analysis, which compares estimates
of the rules' costs of underinclusion ("false negatives" excusing harmful con-
duct) and of overinclusion ("false positives" condemning beneficial con-
duct).94 Kaplow applies a version of this analysis, asking which alternative
rule entails the greater "deterrence benefits" (avoiding false negatives) rela-
tive to "chilling costs" (creating false positives)." Although informed by eco-
nomic theory, the error-cost approach is fundamentally an institutional one
that depends on assessments of judicial competence in actually applying the
rule in litigation and estimates of largely unmeasurable present and future
costs and benefits from altered incentives of both potential defendants and
91 Kaplow, Horizontal Agreements, supra note 28, at 784 n.237; see also KAPLOw, supra note
29, at 356-57.
92 Kaplow, Horizontal Agreements, supra note 28, at 784 n.237 (noting that the firms in Ber-
trand competition have market power and "trade off the profit per unit sold with the quantity of
sales," so that the price is "above the competitive level, the more so the greater the degree of
differentiation," reaching the monopoly price where "the products are not substitutes at all.").
9 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1 (1984).
94 Id. at 16 ("The legal system should be designed to minimize the total costs of (1) anticom-
petitive practices that escape condemnation; (2) competitive practices that are condemned or
deterred; and (3) the system itself.").
95 Kaplow, Direct, supra note 28, at 453; see also Kaplow, Economic Approach, supra note
28, at 362-70.
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potential plaintiffs. These estimates, based in part on intuition and ideology,
can have an important effect on the advocacy and selection of legal rules.96
Under error-cost analysis, whether the subjective standard of liability (or
the direct approach, as Kaplow terms it) is better than the current law's objec-
tive standard depends on whether, if put into practice, it would deter more
instances of inefficient conduct and fewer instances of efficient conduct. The
relevant inefficiencies are those associated with interdependent noncompeti-
tive oligopoly pricing. The subjective definition would directly prohibit pric-
ing that is both interdependent and noncompetitive; it would not prohibit
interdependent competitive pricing or noncompetitive independent pricing.
The objective definition is apparently less direct. It focuses on communication
as a means of achieving interdependent pricing, adding an element, or proxy,
to the core questions of interdependence and noncompetitiveness.
I will argue in this Part that a rule defined in terms of communication is
preferable to one stated only in terms of oligopolistic interdependence, as
Kaplow defines it. First, I examine the extent to which the subjective defini-
tion would reduce false negatives by prohibiting harmful conduct that the ob-
jective definition currently permits. Second, I consider whether a pure version
of the subjective definition would create new false negatives by immunizing
harmful conduct that present law prohibits. Finally, I consider whether the
subjective definition's reliance on the meeting-of-the-minds standard would
create new false positives by increasing the likelihood of imposing liability
for independent monopoly and oligopoly conduct. I will argue that adopting
the subjective definition would eliminate few serious false negatives but
would create a risk of both new false negatives and new false positives.
A. AVOIDING CURRENT FALSE NEGATIVES: PROHIBITING
PURE INTERDEPENDENCE
Everyone agrees that firms can sometimes-in theory, in the lab, and in
practice-coordinate their prices and other decisions without communicating
directly.97 Kaplow's proposal to prohibit this sort of successful coordination
would therefore prohibit some noncompetitive conduct and its attendant wel-
96 See generally William H. Page, The Ideological Origins and Evolution of U.S. Antitrust
Law, in 1 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1, 2 (W.
Dale Collins ed., 2008) (arguing that "two great, opposing ideologies of the market and the state
have shaped antitrust evolution from its inception").
9 Marco A. Haan et al., Experimental Results on Collusion, in EXPERIMENTS AND COMPETI-
TION POLICY 9, 14 (Jeroen Hinloopen & Hans-Theo Normann eds., 2009). These authors note
that, where firms are asymmetric in size, they "at least need to communicate in order to make
some agreement about which of the infinitely many equilibria they are going to play," and to
police them. Id.
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fare losses that the communications-based rule does not reach." But the fre-
quency of successful real-world coordination without communication is not
clear.99 Communicating makes it easier to coordinate.'0 As one judge put it,
"[S]uccessful price coordination requires accurate predictions about what
other competitors will do; it is easier to predict what people mean to do if they
tell you."' 0' The market's own mechanisms will ordinarily be able to thwart
purely tacit coordination. Consequently, durable and costly instances of tacit
coordination are probably rare.
Members of a real-world cartel have to resolve issues related to prices,
output levels, and product standards, all of which require periodic reconsider-
ation. 102 They also must figure out how to detect and punish cheating. 03 In
markets of any complexity, all of these functions will usually require commu-
nication to have any chance of success.'" Gas stations at a remote street cor-
ner may be able to collude by posting prices, but sellers in markets with
private pricing, uncertain demand, and strategic buyers (or some combination
of these) would probably find tacit collusion impossible to implement.o10 In a
98 KAPLOW, supra note 29, at 394-97.
9 Kaplow discusses this scenario as the "narrow paradox region." Kaplow, Direct, supra note
28, at 498-500. He suggests that, if this state of affairs were true, then there would be no great
difference in extending the prohibition of Section 1 to interdependent pricing. Id. at 500-01. I
suggest below that the move to the pure interdependence standard would entail other false posi-
tives and false negatives.
100 MICHAEL D. WHINSTON, LECTURES ON ANTITRUST EcoNoMicS 21 (2006) ("It is natural to
think that talking may help with this coordination, but exactly to what degree, and in what cir-
cumstances is less clear."); XAVIER VIVES, OLIGOPOLY PRICING: OLD IDEAS AND NEW TOOLS
321 (1999) ("In repeated games ... in the presence of imperfect monitoring and privately ob-
served signals, it is not known whether full collusion is possible without communication or
whether communication is even needed for collusion [but] the presumption is that communica-
tion abets collusion."); see also Joseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, Cheap Talk, J. EcON. PERSPS.,
Summer 1996, at 103, 110-11 (observing that, when parties want to meet for dinner, the expres-
sion by one of them of an intention to go to a particular restaurant is cheap talk but still helpful to
coordination; people who think otherwise "tend to eat alone.").
101 Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., 203 F.3d 1028, 1042 (8th Cir. 2000)
(Gibson, J., dissenting).
102 Herbert Hovenkamp & Christopher R. Leslie, The Firm as Cartel Manager, 64 VAND. L.
REV. 813, 825-37 (2011); Baker, supra note 47, at 156 (observing that members of a cartel
"must determine the terms of their coordinated arrangement, monitor deviation, and credibly
threaten to punish deviation sufficiently in order to deter cheating in the first instance.").
103 On punishing cheating, see Green & Porter, supra note 49. On both detection and punish-
ment, see David Genesove & Wallace P. Mullin, Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narra-
tive Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case, 91 AM. EcON. REV. 379 (2001). Unlike Green and
Porter, Genesove and Mullin find that detection of cheating in the Sugar Institute case led to a
process of investigation and adjudication that ended sometimes in a measured retaliation and
sometimes in a confession of guilt and promise to do better. Id. at 390-93.
04 See Hovenkamp & Leslie, supra note 102, at 837-42; see also Joseph E. Harrington, Jr.,
How Do Cartels Operate?, 2 FOUNDS. & TRENDS IN MICROECON. 1, 74-76 (2006).
05 MARSHALL & MARX, supra note 21, at 9-17. For a real-world example of far more complex
gasoline price fixing, see Can Erutku & Vincent A. Hildebrand, Conspiracy at the Pump, 53 J.L.
& ECON. 223 (2010); see also BORK, supra note 11, at 175 ("The difficulty of maintaining small-
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simple market, it is conceivable that rivals with similar backgrounds and be-
liefs could tacitly reach a meeting of the minds on a focal price by a series of
conjectures about each other's strategies; in more-complicated markets, such
an outcome is unlikely.1" As only one example, Joseph Harrington has re-
cently found in experimental studies that coordination by price announce-
ments without direct communication is only possible in markets in which
there are few sellers and all have symmetric cost functions. 0
Communication is also helpful more generally to foster the sort of trust
among members that successful cartels typically need to succeed.'"0 More-
complex markets necessarily involve less complete initial cartel agreements
and greater need for communication to fill in the blanks and modify terms
based on experience.'" Where firms in more complex markets do maintain
parallel noncompetitive practices for a long time, courts may properly infer
that they are communicating, even without direct evidence."s0
It is also not clear that courts would detect many instances of tacit collusion
under a rule framed in terms of interdependence. Many of the problems of
inference that plague prosecution of explicit cartels would still apply to proof
of tacit collusion. Consider the example of facilitating practices."' Rivals may
adopt a facilitating practice independently (when it provides independent ben-
number cartels based upon detailed communication and agreement should ... make us dubious
that concerted action without explicit communication is likely to be at all common or
successful.").
106 Green et al., supra note 52, at 32 ("[B]ecause most market environments are sufficiently
complex that there are numerous possible ways to collude, none of which will work unless it is
adopted by all of the significant market participants, that view suggests that it is difficult, and
probably rare, for successful collusion to obtain in the absence of explicit communication.").
107 See Joseph E. Harrington, Jr. et al., The Relative Efficacy of Price Announcements and
Express Communication for Collusion: Experimental Findings (Feb. 8, 2013) (unpublished man-
uscript), available at http://warrington.ufl.edulcenters/pprc/docs/conference20l3_Harrington.
pdf; see also Miguel A. Fonseca & Hans-Theo Normann, Explicit vs. Tacit Collusion-The Im-
pact of Communication in Oligopoly Experiments, 56 EUR. EcON. Rev. 1759, 1760 (2012) (find-
ing that "talking leads to higher profits in markets with any number of firms" and "collusion is
easier the fewer the firms," but "medium-sized industries [in terms of the number of firms]
hav[el the largest additional profit from talking."); Astri Muren & Roger Pyddoke, Collusion
Without Communication, 18 INFo. EcON. & POL'Y 43, 51 (2006) (in experiments, "tacit collusion
occurs only in duopoly markets.").
108 Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 538 (2004)
("Communication seems to have a linear relationship with trust.").
1o9 Genesove & Mullin, supra note 103, at 379-87.
110 Cf. City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 572 (11th Cir. 1998) ("Oligo-
polists behaving in a legal, consciously parallel fashion could achieve high and rising prices,
even as costs remained stable, by engaging in price leadership. The odds that they could achieve
a price and profit increase and maintain incredibly high incumbency rates-that is, maintain the
very same distribution of municipal contracts year after year-are miniscule, however, unless the
oligopolists were communicating with one another.") (citations omitted).
I I See generally William H. Page, Facilitating Practices and Concerted Action Under Section
1 of the Sherman Act, in ANTrrRUST LAW AND EcONomics 23 (Keith Hylton ed., 2010).
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNA.L
efits apart from coordination); interdependently (as a substitute for an explicit
collusive agreement); or by explicit collusion (as a means of enforcing a col-
lusive agreement). The third category is already illegalll 2 and the first cate-
gory is legal even under Kaplow's expanded definition."' Thus, the only
additional practices the expanded definition would reach would be those in
the second category: facilitating practices that firms adopt interdependently,
without an independent justification and without communicating.
But firms usually have independent justifications for using facilitating prac-
tices. In the Du Pont (Ethyl) case,1"4 for example, the court found independent
justifications for the defendants' use of advance price announcements, price
protection clauses, and delivered pricing, even though they contributed to
price uniformity."5 Consider also resale price maintenance. The Supreme
Court in Leegin" 6 recognized that industry-wide resale price maintenance is a
facilitating practice because it sometimes makes it easier for a manufacturers'
cartel to detect when members cheat by offering secret discounts to retail-
ers." 7 Thus, resale price maintenance "should be subject to more careful scru-
tiny . . . if many competing manufacturers adopt the practice""' because it
might suggest "the existence of a horizontal cartel."" 9 But manufacturers also
use resale price maintenance to prevent their dealers from free riding on the
promotional activities of other retailers.12 0 Consequently, as Posner has recog-
nized, "the fact that competing sellers engage in resale price maintenance is
an ambiguous sign of cartelization; it may mean only that each of the sellers
in the industry has decided that his own ends would be furthered by control-
ling the resale price of the product."121 Kaplow would agree, even under his
expanded definition of agreement. 2 2 Thus, to establish liability, a plaintiff
112 See, e.g., Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 644-46 (1980) (agreement
among wholesalers not to sell on credit); Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 601
(1936) (agreement among rivals to preannounce prices and, especially, to adhere to them).
113 Kaplow, Direct, supra note 28, at 468 (a facilitating practice provides a basis for inferring
oligopolistic coordination "when there exists no other plausible explanation for the practice.").
114 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC (Ethyl), 729 F.2d 128, 133-34, 140-42 (2d Cir.
1984).
115 But see Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Posted Pricing as a Plus Factor, 7 J. COMPETITION L. &
EcoN. 1, 16 (2011) (identifying economic evidence that suggests that posted pricing has been
used to reach agreement or interdependence).
116 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).
"n Leegin, 551 U.S. at 892-93; POSNER, ANTITRUST, supra note 23, at 88-89.
118 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 897.
" Id. at 893.
12 0 See id. at 890.
121 POSNER, ANTITRUST, supra note 23, at 89. Interestingly, Turner suggested that it would be
"an unlawful agreement for oligopolists to make interdependent decisions to adopt [resale price
maintenance], regardless of the means employed." See Turner, supra note 1, at 681.
122 Kaplow, Economic Approach, supra note 28, at 395 (describing ambiguous effects of resale
price maintenance on dealer rivalry).
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would need to offer evidence that tended to exclude the possibility that manu-
facturers were using resale price maintenance to control free riding. If the
plaintiff succeeded in doing so, however, it could well be plausible to infer
that the firms adopted the practice by communicating. 123 Thus, it is not clear
how many more uses of facilitating practices the pure interdependence stan-
dard would reach.
The subjective approach would certainly condemn some interdependent oli-
gopoly conduct that present law permits. But the false negatives we are exper-
iencing under current law may not be very costly if the newly prohibited
conduct is not durable or durably inefficient. As I noted earlier, the error-cost
framework for rulemaking poses an institutional question: in what circum-
stances can courts do better than markets in preventing and ending practices
that reduce competition and reduce consumer welfare? In his original formu-
lation of the error-cost framework, Easterbrook observes that markets are gen-
erally self-correcting and that even highly concentrated markets can behave
competitively,124 while courts and legal standards are far less adaptable and
prone to costly misapplication of even well-designed standards. This pre-
sumption is relevant to the issue of defining agreement. Noncompetitive coop-
erative equilibria are often unstable, even apart from legal prohibitions.
Regardless of the means of cooperation, the noncompetitive understanding is
legally unenforceable 25 and cheating, entry, and fringe expansion tend to
erode supracompetitive prices. 126
123 For instances in which it would have been proper to infer communication from the use of
facilitating practices, see Page, Neo-Chicago, supra note 17, at 193-200, which discusses Erutku
& Hildebrand, supra note 105, at 225; Robert C. Marshall et al., Cartel Price Announcements:
The Vitamins Industry, 26 INT'L J. INDUS. ORG. 762, 763 (2008); and Zhongmin Wang, Collusive
Communication and Pricing Coordination in a Retail Gasoline Market, 32 REV. INDUS. ORG. 35
(2008).
124 Easterbrook, supra note 93, at 19 n.36 (citing studies that "suggest that the structure-con-
duct-performance paradigm on which much of antitrust is based-the belief that certain condi-
tions are conducive to collusion and monopoly overcharges-may not be sound.").
125 Kaplow, Economic Approach, supra note 28, at 372 ("[T]he mere fact that laws make cartel
agreements legally unenforceable has some effect, and possibly a significant one, in reducing the
extent of oligopoly pricing.'').
126 See, e.g., Director & Levi, supra note 13, at 294 ("[P]rice-fixing agreements, when adher-
ence to them cannot be compelled through coercion or penalties, might be self-correcting either
through the defection of members, which would be rewarding to the individual firm, or through
the advent of new firms."). Haan et al., supra note 97, at 15, notes that collusion "becomes more
difficult as the number of firms increases, as firms meet less often, or as firms observe each
other's behavior less often." Cf Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, Breaking Up Is
Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Duration, 54 J.L. & ECON. 455 (2011) (most explicit cartels
break up because of legal intervention); Amanda P. Reeves & Maurice Stucke, Behavioral Anti-
trust, 86 IND. L.J. 1527, 1563-67 (2011) (explicit cartels can sometimes overcome the efforts of
large buyers to induce cheating).
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Noncompetitive cooperative equilibria are almost certainly even more un-
stable if the participants never communicate.127 Even if conditions are highly
conducive to oligopolistic coordination, as in the circumstances that pose the
paradox of proof, it will often be difficult for rivals to make accurate infer-
ences about their rivals' motives and intentions for a long time without com-
munication. 128 Thus, as a first approximation, the market itself is more likely
to erode a tacit cooperative equilibrium than an explicit cartel. A rule prohibit-
ing tacit coordination would reach and deter some inefficient conduct, but the
magnitude of the benefits would likely be limited.129 On the other hand, be-
cause it must be applied by courts in litigation, it raises a risk of imposing
greater false positives, as I will explain in more detail below.
B. NEW FALSE NEGATIVES: EXCUSING COLLUSIVE COMPETITIVE
EQUILIBRIA ACHIEVED BY COMMUNICATION
Kaplow recognizes that oligopolists may reach a meeting of the minds on
an equilibrium at the competitive level. The firms, in this instance, are on the
same page about the appropriate market equilibrium-it just happens to be the
competitive one. Kaplow, however, would apparently only condemn success-
ful noncompetitive oligopoly pricing-interdependence that raises prices
above the competitive level-because it makes little sense to create an anti-
trust rule that prohibits competitive pricing. But to exclude competitive pric-
ing from the definition of price fixing would change long-established law in
troubling ways.13 0
127 Levenstein & Suslow, supra note 126, at 485 (cartels that use a mechanism to control the
incentive to cheat are more stable); Christopher R. Leslie, Cartels, Agency Costs, and Finding
Virtue in Faithless Agents, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1621, 1629 (2008) ("Successful cartels
have devised mechanisms that enable members to trust one another not to cheat, such as develop-
ing personal relationships among competitors, undertaking goodwill gestures among cartel mem-
bers, having frequent and open communications, making price more transparent, and creating a
group identity and attendant social norms of cooperation among cartel members.").
128 Individuals coordinating physical tasks, like surgery or repairing a machine, can often infer
each others' minds from their faces, eyes, and actions in the work environment but they still will
often require some communication to be successful. Susan R. Fussell et al., Visual Cues as
Evidence of Other Minds in Collaborative Physical Tasks, in OTHER MINDS: How HUMANS
BRIDGE THE DIVIDE BETWEEN SELF AND OTHERS 91 (Bertram F. Malle & Sara D. Hodges eds.,
2005). In coordinating market choices, firms that do not communicate directly must infer each
others' minds and motives at a distance with far less information.
129 An exception may be the gas turbine market, in which the duopoly of General Electric and
Westinghouse was able to maintain noncompetitive prices for 15 years, apparently without pri-
vate communication, using detailed price books and a price protection plans. See Barak Y.
Orbach, The Duropolist Puzzle: Monopoly Power in Durable-Goods Markets, 21 YALE J. REG.
67 (2004).
130 See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397-98 (1927) ("[W]e
should hesitate to adopt a construction making the difference between legal and illegal conduct
in the field of business relations depend upon so uncertain a test as whether prices are reasona-
ble-a determination which can be satisfactorily made only after a complete survey of our eco-
nomic organization and a choice between rival philosophies.").
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Consider the following scenario.'31 Bombay and 2 Bros. are pizza parlors
on the same block of Sixth Avenue in New York City, both charging $1 per
slice. One day in March 2012, Bombay cut the price to 79 cents; then next day
2 Bros. cut its price to 75 cents, which Bombay matched. The new price was
below both stores' costs. In September, after months of defiantly losing
money, the owners both raised their prices back to $1. According to one ac-
count, the two owners met and communicated: "I said, 'We lose money, and
the customer wins,' [one] recalled. He said, 'You're right."" 32 According to a
later published account, however, there was no communication before the two
shops raised prices: "The establishment was losing money and unable to pay
bills or meet its rent at the 75 cent rate and therefore independently decided to
raise the price back up to $1. Any similarity between the prices was simply a
coincidence." 33
Setting aside the relative credibility of these accounts, should there be any
legal difference between the actions they describe? Assume that $1 is a com-
petitive price (and it is a very good price for a slice of pizza in New York)134
and 75 cents is below marginal cost for both businesses. Consider first the
rivals' return to the price of $1 in the second, noncommunicative scenario.
The two parlors' actions were certainly interdependent: the first parlor raised
prices and the second, recognizing an opportunity to end the price war, chose
to match it rather than maintain the low price and capture the lion's share of
the business on the block. Nevertheless, their actions would be lawful under
either current law or Kaplow's proposed standard. Under current law, the ri-
vals' action would be lawful because they did not communicate. Under
Kaplow's standard, the rivals' actions would be lawful, but for a different
reason: the new price was competitive. The firms reached a meeting of the
minds, but not to charge a supracompetitive price.
One might argue that below-cost pricing is always a phase that a firm en-
dures in hopes of raising prices in a later phase, after disciplining (or destroy-
ing) a rival or after building loyalty to its own product. In the latter context, in
which below-cost pricing is a promotional expense, interdependent action to
shorten the low-price phase might be anticompetitive in a dynamic sense.
Nevertheless, as a practical matter, the conduct in the scenario would have to
'' Chester Higgins, Jr., $1 Pizza Slice Is Back After a Sidewalk Showdown Ends Two Parlors'
Price War, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2012, at A21.
132 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
133 Jennifer Williams, From Pizza Wars to Price Fixing, N.Y. L. SCH. LEGAL As SHE IS SPOKE
(Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.lasisblog.com/2012/09/28/from-pizza-wars-to-price-fixing/ (sum-
marizing the position of one owner).
134 See, e.g., Susana Kim, A Little Slice of New York-Style Inflation, WNYC NEws (May 13,
2011), http://www.wnyc.org/articles/wnyc-news/2011 /may/13/blog-a_1ittle-sliceofnewyork
style-inflation/ (reporting an average price of $2.46).
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be legal. If the market is ever to return to a competitive equilibrium, with
prices equal to marginal cost, and the firins are fully informed of each other's
moves as they must be in this hypothetical, the return must almost certainly
involve some sort of meeting the minds.135 Courts could not realistically con-
demn coordination to achieve a static competitive outcome rather than some
hypothetical dynamic competitive outcome.
But what about the first scenario, in which the proprietors discussed the
situation directly and each expressed his intention to return to the competitive
price? Under present law, which does not allow "competitive evils to be a
defense to price-fixing conspiracies,"'3 6 this sort of concerted action achieved
through communication would be per se unlawful.' 7 Yet if, as a strictly sub-
jective approach would suggest, communication is not the defining element of
illegal coordinated pricing, such a scenario would seem to be lawful: it
achieves the same result, with very much the same mental states of the partici-
pants, as the scenario in which the parlors each decide to return to the compet-
itive price through a tacit meeting of the minds. Communication provides a
mechanism, but not an essential element.
Kaplow suggests that the law might separately prohibit certain communica-
tions as facilitating practices.'38 But communication in this scenario is not a
facilitating practice in the usual sense. Facilitating practices are usually dura-
ble mechanisms that make it easier for firms to reach or to police an under-
standing by, for example, making prices more transparent and simplifying the
monitoring process over a period of time. An agreement to adopt a facilitating
practice can be illegal, even if there is no separate, express agreement on
price. So, for example, an agreement to announce in advance and adhere to
prices,'39 to deny short-term credit,140 to use basing point pricing,141 or to re-
port price quotes to rivals,142 all make pricing more transparent and thus make
it easier to detect when firms are deviating from a price understanding. In the
communication version of the pizza incident, however, the communications
135 If marginal cost is upward-sloping, even an "independent" choice to price at marginal cost
would require the firm to take account of its rivals' price and output. If the prices were identical,
as in the hypothetical, firms must have reached that price and output combination by something
like a meeting of the minds.
136 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940).
37 See id. at 223 ("[A] combination formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising,
depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign com-
merce is illegal per se."); id. at 228 ("[P]rice-fixing combinations ... are illegal per se; they are
not evaluated in terms of their purpose, aim or effect in the elimination of so-called competitive
evils.").
138 See Kaplow, Horizontal Agreements, supra note 28, at 715-19.
139 Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
140 Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643 (1980).
141 FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948).
142 United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
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were not pursuant to any separate agreement and they did not merely facilitate
an understanding on prices. The communications of intention and reliance
were actions that became unlawful under Section 1 only when the firms acted
consistently with them; at that point, their pricing became objectively con-
certed action.143 By conveying rivals' intentions and reliance, they were insep-
arable from the formation of the common mental state itself and, together with
that mental state, integral to the conduct.
Strict adherence to the subjective theory in this case would base liability on
whether rivals interdependently achieved a noncompetitive result, not on
whether rivals communicated. If it would be legal to reach a meeting of minds
to end a below-cost price war simply by announcing price increases, it should
be legal to do so by privately expressing an intention to increase prices and a
reliance on your rival to do the same. But such a rule would involve a prob-
lematic change in present law. Coordination of price movements by commu-
nication is intrinsically more suspicious than coordination by interdependent
conjectures based on general knowledge. The change might not matter much
if the only consequence was whether the price of pizza by the slice is fixed at
a static competitive level on one block in New York City. But the adoption of
such a rule would place in question important precedents in which cartels
employed explicit communications. For example, in the Socony-Vacuum
case,'" the Supreme Court affirmed criminal convictions of refiners that had
agreed to purchase excess supplies of gasoline in spot markets, even though
much of the excess supply was "hot gasoline" refined from oil produced in
violation of state proration laws and was allegedly being sold at distress
prices, often below the costs of production. In other circumstances, firms
could argue that a market failure, like poorly defined property rights, justified
a price-fixing conspiracy simply to reach the competitive level. 14 In Addyston
Pipe,146 for example, the defendants unsuccessfully argued that the price-fix-
ing agreements were necessary to avoid "ruinous competition," possibly trig-
gered by cost conditions consistent with natural monopoly.'14
143 But cf Larry Fullerton, FTC Challenges "Invitations to Collude," ANTITRUST, Spring 2011,
at 30 (describing FTC complaints and consent agreements in cases alleging invitations to col-
lude, even though not accepted, as violations of Section 5 of the FTC Act).
144 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220-24 (1940).
145 Of course, in Socony-Vacuum, other firms produced at inefficient levels and the conspira-
tors agreed to buy their excess supplies in order to maintain the market price. For that scheme to
work, the conspirators must also have been reducing their own production.
146 United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271, 283 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S.
211 (1899).
147 See George Bittlingmayer, Decreasing Average Cost and Competition: A New Look at the
Addyston Pipe Case, 25 J.L. & EcoN. 201 (1982). Cf. Kaplow, Economic Approach, supra note
28, at 369:
A laissez-faire approach [to price coordination in markets with high fixed costs] is not
entirely without virtues, for as more firms enter, prices may come down somewhat as
2412013]
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Price fixing may be subject to a rule of reason analysis if it is ancillary to an
integration of productive functions, as in Broadcast Music. 148 In circumstances
like the pizza scenario or Socony-Vacuum, however, allowing such a defense
would invite courts to "set sail on a sea of doubt." 49 Such a rule would likely
involve costly false negatives by allowing harmful cartels to escape liability
when they can create doubt whether fixed prices are above competitive levels.
This change would have a significant effect on criminal cases, where fines are
typically based on a share of revenues rather than the magnitude of the over-
charge.s 0 If rivals fix the price at the competitive level, the same mechanism
can be used to coordinate noncompetitive pricing in the future; that danger is
greater if the rivals are communicating.
One might avoid these false negatives by qualifying the subjective theory
of concerted action and preserving the traditional prohibition on rivals' use of
communication to reach a meeting of the minds on any price. Under this ap-
proach, even if a meeting of the minds on a competitive price reached by
interdependent conduct would be lawful, the same meeting of minds reached
by direct communication could be unlawful. Posner adopts this view in his
analysis of rivals responding to a common cost increase.'' He warns against
"pressing the 'meeting of the minds' approach too far" 52 and condemning
firms for taking account of one another's responses to the cost increase in
deciding how much to raise prices. Such a process might lead to a tacit agree-
ment on a common price, Posner believes, but it would be "inevitable and
unobjectionable."'5 3 On the other hand, "if the firms explicitly coordinated
their pricing in reaction to the cost change, the law would [properly] treat their
agreement as illegal collusion" because "there would be justifiable suspicion
that the agreement was both unnecessary to a smooth adjustment to the cost
increase and motivated, at least in part, by a desire to raise the price by more
than the cost increase actually justified." 5 4 The same reasoning applies to the
dueling pizza scenarios.
price elevation is more difficult to maintain, and it is possible that the benefit from
such price reduction would outweigh the waste from excessive entry (although it may
not). In any case, it is hardly clear that an optimal response would be to permit
whatever price elevation can be achieved without certain forms of explicit communica-
tions but to disallow all other price elevation.
148 See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1979); see also Christo-
pher R. Leslie, Comment, Achieving Efficiency Through Collusion: A Market Failure Defense to
Horizontal Price Fixing, 81 CAL. L. REv. 243, 288-91 (1993).
149 Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 284.
I50 Kaplow, Economic Approach, supra note 28, at 424-25.






In this passage, Posner recognizes that the use of communication in this
instance is not merely a facilitating practice, nor is it the subject of a separate
agreement; it is integral to the meeting of minds on the price and it supplies
the reason why a meeting of minds on a competitive price should be illegal.
His rationale for condemning collusion in these circumstances reflects the ob-
jective theory of concerted action and exposes the limitations of the subjective
theory as a basis for liability. If the relevant social harm is noncompetitive
pricing pursuant to a meeting of minds, as the subjective theory maintains,
then the law should focus on whether the price is noncompetitive, not on
whether the conduct involves communication. A tacit agreement on how
much to raise prices after a cost increase would be illegal if it resulted, after a
costly process of signaling, in a price that was not fully cost-justified; the
express agreement would be legal if it resulted instantly in a new competitive
equilibrium that was cost-justified.
Posner rejects this legal framing of the issues in favor of one based on
communication. Consistently with the objective theory, Posner recognizes that
rivals' use of communication to coordinate a market outcome is more likely to
be inefficient than the same rivals' use of their general knowledge of each
other's present and likely future actions. Where communications are "unnec-
essary" to a legitimate purpose they raise a "suspicion" that they have an
illegitimate purpose, even if the present result is a competitive equilibrium.
These intuitions help explain why courts have come to view communication
as part of the definition of agreement, a benchmark of anticompetitive effect,
not simply as a facilitating practice.
C. NEw FALSE NEGATIVES: EXCUSING NONSTRATEGIC NONCOMPETITIVE
EQUILIBRIA ACHIEVED BY COMMUNICATION
We also saw in the last Part that Kaplow excludes the noncompetitive one-
shot equilibria, such as the Coumot and differentiated Bertrand models, from
the category of interdependent oligopoly because each firm takes the esti-
mated actions of its rivals as a given in choosing to price above the competi-
tive level. In litigation, to infer whether prohibited collusion has occurred,
courts must recognize these sorts of nonstrategic equilibria as possible expla-
nations for noncompetitive pricing.' 5 As I will argue later in this Part, making
this distinction in litigation would be difficult if the law condemned purely
interdependent noncompetitive equilibria.
But suppose the evidence clearly showed that rivals privately communi-
cated their intentions and reliance with respect to output in a Coumot setting
or with respect to prices in a Bertrand setting and thereby reached the oligop-
155 See Werden, supra note 55, at 776.
2013] 243
ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL
oly equilibrium, but not the monopoly equilibrium.'56 Under present law, the
use of these sorts of communications to reach a noncompetitive equilibrium
would be unlawful, even if doing so without communications was theoreti-
cally possible. Put another way, the use of communication to achieve a non-
strategic noncompetitive outcome would be illegal. Under the subjective
model of concerted action, however, only a meeting of the minds in the strate-
gic sense of an infinitely repeated game is unlawful. The use of communica-
tions would presumably not change this outcome. This result would be even
more problematic than excusing the use of communication to fix competitive
prices, as described in the last section. In this instance, the law would condone
explicitly fixed prices at a noncompetitive level.
D. NEW FALSE POSITIVEs: DISTINGUISHING MONOPOLY
In this Part and the next, I consider whether a pure subjective standard will
allow courts adequately to distinguish in litigation certain noncompetitive
equilibria that Kaplow excludes from coverage. Because Kaplow very prop-
erly would not prohibit all noncompetitive pricing, the existence of pricing
above marginal cost is relevant to the existence of coordination, but not deter-
minative. But it will be difficult for courts to distinguish these sorts of non-
competitive equilibria achieved by independent calculation from those
achieved by a strategic calculation that leads to meeting of the minds.
We have already seen that Kaplow would not prohibit unilateral exploita-
tion of monopoly power by a monopolist, because doing so would inhibit
innovation and risk taking. The same concerns, he argues, do not apply to
coordinated oligopoly pricing. But monopolists do not exist in vacuums. Even
a monopolist must be aware of the competitive actions of other firms, such as
the producers of substitutes and potential entrants, and those other firms must
be aware of the monopolist's actions. In the extreme case, if there are increas-
ing returns to scale, the incumbent firm may fear total displacement by a po-
tential entrant.' An agreement between regional or single-product
monopolists not to enter each others' markets would, of course, be per se
illegal."' But there are many actions that firms may take to deter entry by
156 See, e.g., Maria Goltsman & Gregory Pavioc, Communication in Cournot Oligopoly (Univ.
of W. Ont., Dep't of Econ. Research Report Series, Working Paper No. 2012-1, 2012), available
at http://economics.uwo.ca/research/department-working-papers-docs/wp2012/wp2012_1.pdf;
Israel Waichman et al., Pre-play Communication in Cournot Competition: An Experiment with
Students and Managers (Christian-Albrechts-Universitit Kiel, Dep't of Econ., Working Paper
No. 2010,09, 2010), available at http://hdl.handle.net/10419/41551. '
'7 WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY
STRUCTURE (1982).
58 See, e.g., Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 595-96 (1951). In
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 765 (1984), the Court disap-
proved Timken's reference to the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, but recognized that the
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potential rivals, actions that might be viewed as signals. An incumbent firm
might deter entry by making investments in sunk costs and signaling "com-
mitment to aggressive post-entry competition."'59 Thus, when an incumbent
charges noncompetitive prices and the potential entrant does not enter, it is
possible to characterize their decision not to do so as the product of a meeting
of the minds-an agreement to divide markets.
In Twombly, the Supreme Court held that regional telephone monopolists'
mutual decisions not to enter each others' markets, unaided by communica-
tion, did not constitute an agreement:
In a traditionally unregulated industry with low barriers to entry, sparse
competition among large firms dominating separate geographical segments
of the market could very well signify illegal agreement, but here we have an
obvious alternative explanation. In the decade preceding the 1996 Act and
well before that, monopoly was the norm in telecommunications, not the
exception. The ILECs were born in that world, doubtless liked the world the
way it was, and surely knew the adage about him who lives by the sword.
Hence, a natural explanation for the noncompetition alleged is that the for-
mer Government-sanctioned monopolists were sitting tight, expecting their
neighbors to do the same thing.160
Kaplow notes this passage and its evident endorsement of a "narrow view of
agreement, one that excludes interdependent oligopolistic behavior,"'61 but
dismisses Twombly as not articulating a definition of agreement or distin-
guishing earlier precedent reflecting a broader view. But "sitting tight, expect-
ing their neighbors to do the same thing" is a fair description of a meeting of
the minds.162 In giving this "alternative" explanation for the rival ILEC's ac-
tions, the Court expressly held that the thought process it described was not a
market allocation agreement. Even if there were internal memoranda docu-
menting the firms' thought processes and even if the firms admitted those
processes in depositions, the conduct would be lawful. And, of course, if they
reached the same result by communicating, the conduct would be unlawful.
doctrine "was in no way necessary to the result." Cf. Randy Stutz, Market Allocation in the
Health Insurance Industry and the McCarran -Ferguson Act, 89 OR. L. REV. 885, 888-91 (2011)
(discussing allegations of market allocation by insurers).
15 Jonathan B. Baker, Responding to Developments in Economics and the Courts: Entry in the
Merger Guidelines, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 189, 194 n.31 (2003).
160 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 567-68 (2007) (citation omitted).
161 Kaplow, Horizontal Agreements, supra note 28, at 739.
162 In the first part of the quoted passage, Justice Scalia suggests that, if adjacent monopolists
in unregulated markets with low entry barriers had not entered each other's markets, then an
allegation of an illegal agreement to allocate markets might be plausible. The second part of the
passage makes clear that that the "illegal agreement" he had in mind was not simply a meeting of
the minds. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567-68.
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Justice Scalia recognized that, in some circumstances, rivals' persistent re-
fusal to compete may make an allegation that the firms' actions were pursuant
to coordination by direct communications plausible. In the first part of the
quoted passage, he noted that one might infer an "illegal agreement" if re-
gional monopolists in an unregulated market with low entry barriers were not
competing. It would thus be plausible in certain circumstances, where there is
no "alternative explanation," that the regional monopolists had divided mar-
kets by communicating. A standard of liability defined in terms of a meeting
of minds, however, would permit an inference of illegal agreement in far more
instances, including tacit understandings to allocate product lines.163 In oral
argument in Twombly, Chief Justice Roberts facetiously asked if a court could
infer a market-allocation agreement if there were a pet store on the same
block as a grocery store and "the grocery store is not selling pet supplies and
they could make money if they did."'"
Justice Scalia must have thought it unnecessary to explain why firms' mu-
tual decisions to "sit tight expecting their neighbors to do the same" did not
constitute agreement. He might have pointed to the policy of preserving the
incentive to innovate by allowing monopolists to extract a full monopoly
profit. That policy is broad enough to protect monopolists' discretion to con-
sume their monopoly profits rather than place them at risk by entering adjoin-
ing markets, even if adjoining monopolists make the same choice. To hold
otherwise would constrict the safe harbor for unilateral exploitation of monop-
oly power and potentially deter innovation (for example, to reduce the costs of
grocery retailing) by making less certain the reward of monopoly profits. To
hold otherwise would also place courts in the position of second-guessing a
range of decisions by firms about whether to enter adjoining markets.
A legal rule that prohibits noncompetitive, cooperative equilibria achieved
without communication is thus likely to impose significant error costs because
the prospect of damage awards inhibits not only the core conduct that moti-
vates the rule but also efficient, facially similar conduct that firms fear may
trigger liability.165 Direct and indirect purchasers will likely challenge price
163 For example, in Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 190 (7th Cir.
1985), Judge Easterbrook held that an agreement between retailers not to sell competing products
was ancillary to a productive joint venture to build a new space to house both retailers and
therefore subject to a rule of reason analysis. Were there no such joint yenture agreement, how-
ever, decisions by retailers in the same building not to sell competing products might be subject
to challenge as concerted action.
16 Transcript of Oral Argument at 31, Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (No.
05-1126), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument-transcripts/05-
1126.pdf.
165 Kaplow suggests that it would be preferable to address problems of overdeterrence by in-
creasing the burden of proof for coordinated oligopoly pricing (extending liability to the entire
region of the paradox of proof) rather than insisting on proof of particular means of coordination.
Kaplow, Direct, supra note 28, at 510-11. I will not discuss this suggestion further because it is
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increases whenever the legal rule creates a chance of recovery or settlement
that warrants the expense of suit.'" Consequently, a subjective definition of
agreement may impose substantial and long-lasting costs by deterring non-
interdependent conduct that courts cannot easily distinguish from harmful
conduct. Kaplow suggests that the law could reduce chilling costs by chal-
lenging only significant price elevations. But the proposed rule would also
have to distinguish lawful practices that result in price elevations.16 The no-
tion of a meeting of minds is not a promising standard for distinguishing
harmful noncompetitive interdependent equilibria from facially similar non-
competitive independent equilibria.
E. NEW FALSE POSITIVES: DISTINGUISHING NONCOLLUSIVE
NONCOMPETITIVE OLIGOPOLY
Other instances of apparently independent noncompetitive pricing may also
involve equilibria that resemble interdependent oligopoly pricing in important
respects and may lead to new false positives.168 Kaplow recognizes the poten-
tial for false positives, but suggests that "[m]any means of detection identify
interdependence per se and thus do distinguish the cases." 69 But false posi-
tives are nevertheless likely. Consider first dominant firm pricing, which we
concluded represented unilateral exercise of monopoly power, if it conformed
to the classic static model. Recall that, in that model, the dominant firm takes
the fringe firms' output as given and sets a monopoly price based on the
residual demand; the fringe firms set their output at the point at which their
marginal cost equals the dominant firm's price. 70 Economists have shown,
however, that even dominant and fringe firms have incentives to make strate-
gic choices.' 7' The dominant firm must estimate the prospect of fringe expan-
not clear how or in what form such a change in the ordinary civil burden of persuasion might
occur.
16 See Kaplow, Economic Approach, supra note 28, at 433.
167 Id. at 415.
168 Compare Coate, supra note 71, at 35-36, pointing out many challenges to isolating success-
ful oligopoly pricing based on empirical evidence:
Economists have a broad range of performance indicators, often with indirect ties to
competition. For example, some considerations are closely related to the theoretical
concept of profits (prices well above relevant costs), but difficult to measure; others
are tangentially related to profit (stable market share), but easier to measure. Thus, it is
possible for performance considerations to be mis-measured and artificially correlated
with structural concerns. This would allow an incorrect inference of a competitive
concern. Examples include inferences of monopoly profit due to high margins, but
really caused by high fixed cost conditions in the market or stable market shares driven
by a static customer base.
169 Kaplow, Economic Approach, supra note 28, at 445.
170 See id. at 369.
171 See W. Kip Viscusi ET AL., EcoNoMIcs OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 177-82 (4th ed.
2005) (discussing Darius W. Gaskins, Jr., Dynamic Limit Pricing: Optimal Pricing under Threat
of Entry, 3 J. EcoN. THEORY 306 (1971); Kenneth L. Judd & Bruce C. Petersen, Dynamic Limit
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sion through investment in new capacity. A higher price may allow the fringe
firm to earn substantial rents. The fringe firm may then invest those rents in
new capacity, making its supply function and the dominant firm's residual
demand curve more elastic. The dominant firm, however, may set lower
prices in order to deter expansion and prolong its dominant position. Or it may
set a limit price and exclude the fringe from the market entirely.
Suppose, however, that we observe that a dominant firm is setting its short-
run profit-maximizing price, which the fringe firm is matching at its marginal
cost.'72 The fringe firm, however, is not retaining its earnings to invest in new
capacity, perhaps fearing that the dominant firm would adopt a strategy of
dynamic limit pricing if it increased capacity. Here it would appear that the
choices of the dominant and fringe firms are not independent static choices
(taking each other's decisions as given), but strategic. They represent a form
of coordination to reach and sustain the noncompetitive equilibrium.173 If,
before reaching this equilibrium, the dominant firm had communicated its
pricing intentions and its reliance on the fringe firm not to invest in new ca-
pacity, and the fringe firm had communicated its intention to match the price
and to consume the resulting rents rather than investing them in new capacity,
the resulting equilibrium would be collusive. If the firms did not communi-
cate, however, it would be problematic to characterize the equilibrium as col-
lusive, despite the strategic thinking on both sides. Yet, under a subjective
theory of concerted action, that inference would seem to be permissible. The
danger is particularly significant, because some of the types of economic evi-
dence that Kaplow identifies as a basis for inference of coordination, particu-
larly price elevation, would also be present in the dominant firm context.
Another possible source of confusion is the size of the fringe firms. The
dominant firm model assumes that fringe firms are sufficiently small to be
price takers. Thus, if there is a dominant firm with 80 percent of the market,
with five fringe producers, each with 4 percent of the market, the model
would appear to hold and the resulting equilibrium would not be interdepen-
dent. But suppose there are only two smaller producers in the market, each
with 10 percent of the market, or one with 20 percent? Now each smaller
producer has choices to make about its price and output. One choice might be
Pricing and Internal Finance, 39 J. EcON. THEORY 368 (1986)); see also KAPLOW, supra note
29, at 348-53 (recognizing problems in identifying a true dominant firm case).
172 Cf. Kaplow, Economic Approach, supra note 28, at 369-70 (recognizing dangers of false
positives from basing liability on whether higher-cost oligopolists are pricing at marginal cost).
173 A related issue arises if small fringe firms are matching the price of a cartel with a dominant
market share. See Iwan Bos & Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., Endogenous Cartel Formation with
Heterogeneous Firms, 41 RAND J. EcON. 92 (2010). The fringe firms might be criminally liable,
even if they did not participate in the formation or execution of the cartel.
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to follow the dominant firm's price.17 4 But if it did so, it would appear it acted
pursuant to a meeting of the minds with the dominant firm."' It seems a slen-
der reed to determine the liability of the rival based on an indistinct point at
which it becomes large enough that its decision to follow the lead of the larger
firm is not determined.
Recall also that Kaplow would also exclude Coumot and differentiated Ber-
trand equilibria from the category of interdependent pricing. In the Cournot
quantity-setting model of duopoly, each firm individually sets its output at the
point where marginal cost equals marginal revenue, taking its rival's output as
given. The resulting price and output combination is above the competitive
level, because each firm is exploiting its measure of market power, but below
the monopoly level. Suppose, however, that buyers allege that the firms have
gone beyond the standard Cournot calculation and have jointly coordinated a
higher price and a lower output, albeit without communication. Making such a
distinction would be extraordinarily challenging, in the absence of
admissions.176
Kaplow has two responses to this concern."' First, he suggests that, in a
Cournot equilibrium, firms would be operating at or near capacity and there
would be little evidence specifically of price coordination. But much of the
evidence of coordination that Kaplow identifies involves pricing patterns and
price elevation that could be similar to pricing in a Cournot equilibrium. Per-
haps a jury could distinguish noncompetitive equilibria on this basis, but it
would involve choosing between complex expert accounts, with a significant
rate of error. Second, Kaplow suggests that the law should not be overly con-
cerned about false positives in this context because the Cournot equilibrium
is, after all, noncompetitive: "unilateral price elevation with homogeneous
goods tends to involve both allocative and dynamic inefficiency, so false posi-
tives (deeming to be interdependent price elevation that is really unilateral)
may actually be beneficial rather than socially costly.""' Nevertheless, the
outcome is problematic because firms in the Cournot case have acted indepen-
dently and lawfully, even by Kaplow's broadened definition. The implication
of Kaplow's justification is that the law should simply condemn noncompeti-
174 See Raymond J. Deneckere & Dan Kovenock, Price Leadership, 59 REV. ECON. STUD. 143,
145 (1992).
's Id. (price leadership in these circumstances is "more collusive" that simultaneous price set-
ting); see also KAPLOW, supra note 23, at 348-53 (considering evidentiary problems in this
case).
176 See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Rationalization of Antitrust, 116 HARV. L. REV. 917, 924
(2003) (reviewing POSNER, supra note 23) (evidence of, for example, stable market shares is
equally consistent the Cournot and collusive equilibria).
177 Kaplow, Economic Approach, supra note 28, at 443-45.
'7 Id. at 444.
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tive pricing, regardless of whether it is concerted-a result he rejects
elsewhere.
A similar problem might arise in Bertrand competition in markets with dif-
ferentiated products. Kaplow includes in the category of unilateral conduct
not only monopolists, but Bertrand oligopolists that sell differentiated prod-
ucts at prices above marginal cost. In Kaplow's framework, this sort of pric-
ing is independent, even though the decision involves a choice that requires an
awareness of the likely prices of rival products, because each seller takes the
choices of its rivals as given. In these circumstances, Kaplow observes,
undercutting one's rival ever so slightly will capture only a modest amount
of additional sales. Once again, each firm has some market power. Firms
will trade off the profit per unit sold with the quantity of sales. The result is
a price above the competitive level, the more so the greater the degree of
differentiation.17 9
Kaplow suggests that the very existence of significant differentiation dimin-
ishes the possibility of coordination, so the risk of false positives is likely to
be small.s 0
Nevertheless, markets characterized by this sort of competition may pose
challenging factual issues for a subjective standard of agreement. For exam-
ple, when Microsoft recently introduced its Surface tablet computer, it had to
choose a price that took account of its capabilities relative to the price and
capabilities other tablet manufacturers, such as Apple and Samsung. As
Kaplow recognizes, it would be problematic to prohibit the rivals' choices of
a price point above marginal cost for the same reason that pure monopoly
pricing is lawful: the higher price is in part the reward for innovation that
differentiates the product. Indeed, under present standards, Bertrand competi-
tion can explain noncompetitive pricing in a way that defeats an inference of
collusion.'8 '
An oligopolist selling a differentiated product might not be able profitably
to raise its price if doing so would divert substantial sales to a close rival. It
can solve this problem and raise its prices by acquiring that rival and eliminat-
ing the diversion.'t 2 The same two firms could also profit by remaining sepa-
rate entities, but coordinating prices at a level above a Bertrand equilibrium.'
19 Kaplow, Horizontal Agreements, supra note 28, at 783-84 n.237.
180 See Kaplow, Economic Approach, supra note 28, at 445-46.
181 See In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 186 F.3d 781, 787 (7th Cir. 1999)
(Posner, J.). Posner's analysis is discussed in Werden, supra note 55, at 775-76.
182 See James Langenfeld & Gregory G. Wrobel, Upward Pricing Pressure Under the 2010
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, ArIrrrUsT, Fall 2010, at 21.
183 Cf Jonathan B. Baker & Timothy F. Bresnahan, The Gains from Merger or Collusion in
Product-Differentiated Industries, 33 J. INDUs. EcON. 427, 428 (1985) (equating the estimated
gains from merger and bilateral collusion).
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It would be a difficult task, however, for courts to distinguish the sorts of
accommodations involved in Bertrand competition from successful oligo-
polistic coordination.
III. CONCLUSION
Communication, even it is only cheap talk, is useful and often necessary for
rivals to coordinate price and output decisions. All would agree that evidence
of communication on these issues is relevant to the issue of whether firms
reached an illegal agreement or engaged in concerted action. Most courts and
commentators in recent years would go further and include some form of
communication in the definition of agreement: in order to find liability, the
finder of fact must be able reasonably to infer that the rivals' conduct was the
product of communication, variously defined. Louis Kaplow has recently
challenged this approach in three extensive articles and a major book, all of
which argue that the focus on communications is misguided. Although he
does not propose a full or final definition, he suggests that the standard of
successful oligopolistic interdependence by a meeting of minds, properly de-
fined and qualified, would provide a superior basis for identifying unlawful
agreements.
In this essay, I have outlined Kaplow's subjective theory of concerted ac-
tion and considered its likely costs and benefits relative to the current objec-
tive theory. I suggest that it will deter relatively few durable instances of
oligopolistic interdependence that present law would not reach. On the other
hand, it would seem to immunize some equilibria that have been reached
through communication. If so, it would raise the possibility of new and prob-
lematic defenses to claims of illegal concerted action. Moreover, Kaplow ex-
pressly and implicitly excludes certain noncompetitive equilibria from the
subjective standard on the ground that they do not involve the requisite meet-
ing of minds. But each of these equilibria differs in only a few ways from at
least one other, more strategic, equilibrium that apparently involves a meeting
of minds. Depending on the chosen burden of proof, these distinctions raise
the danger of significant false positives.
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